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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-ninth session
Agenda item 39
THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fiftieth year

Letter dated 22 March 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you the enclosed letter, of today's date, from my President addressed to you.

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating this letter as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 39, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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ANNEX

Letter dated 22 March 1995 from the President of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the Secretary-General

There is a steadily growing gap between the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) as provided for by the Security Council and the actual implementation of that mandate. In view of the fact that it was actually always necessary to strengthen those mechanisms, including the UNPROFOR mandate, that promote the cause of peace and humanitarian efforts, this negative tendency towards the erosion of the mandate is most disconcerting at this time.

Therefore, it is imperative that a thorough review be undertaken of both the current Security Council mandate with respect to UNPROFOR and its actual implementation before it is extended beyond 31 March 1995. There are numerous factors as well as developing events that should be considered in this review, including: the changes for UNPROFOR in Croatia and Macedonia; the expiration of the cease-fire in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the reluctant peace process; Serbia and Montenegro's failure to recognize its neighbours; the deteriorating humanitarian situation; the failure to lift the siege of Sarajevo or even to assure the "blue routes"; the harassment of the operations at Sarajevo airport and access routes therefrom; the violation of the exclusion zone around Sarajevo and Goražde as well as the continuing incursions into the other "safe areas"; the persistent onslaught against Bihać, especially through the violation of our international border with the Republic of Croatia; impeding of humanitarian aid convoys; continuing ethnic cleansing in areas under Serbian occupation; and escalating violations of the "no-fly" zone.

Because the expiration of the current UNPROFOR mandate on 31 March 1995 is a relatively short time away, we would be willing to favourably consider extending the existing mandate for a period of no more than 30 days to accomplish this comprehensive review. We look forward to contributing positively in this review and are prepared to endorse measures designed to promote the peace process, improve effectiveness and the humanitarian situation, and secure the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

(Signed) Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ
President

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S/1995/217
23 March 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 17 MARCH 1995 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to the command of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

Following consultations with the Governments concerned, I wish to inform the Security Council of my intention to appoint Major-General Stanislaw Franciszek Woźniak of Poland as Force Commander of UNIFIL. The post became vacant after the departure of Major-General Trond Furuhovde on 23 February 1995. Major-General Woźniak is to take up his functions on 1 April 1995.

I should be grateful if your could bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

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23 March 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 23 MARCH 1995 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 17 March 1995 (S/1995/217) concerning the appointment of Major-General Stanislaw Franciszek Woźniak of Poland to succeed Major-General Trond Furohovde as Force Commander of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Council. They take note of the information contained in your letter and agree with the proposal made therein.

(Signed) LI Zhaoxing
President of the Security Council

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S/1995/219
25 March 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 24 MARCH 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instruction from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your attention the following instances of violations by Iraq of the terms of the cease-fire between the two countries.

1. On 21 December 1994, at 1120 hours, eight Iraqi forces were observed repairing a bunker at the geographical coordinates of ND 427-050 on the map of Khosravi, in no man's land, west of border pillar 53 and Iraq's Manzarieh sentry post.

2. On 21 December 1994, eight Iraqi forces were observed repairing a bunker near the geographical coordinates of ND 420-050 on the map of Khosravi, in no man's land, north of border pillar 53/2 and Iraq's Manzarieh sentry post.

3. On 22 December 1994, an Iraqi helicopter was observed flying over Khaneghein at the geographical coordinates of ND 350-000 on the map of Khosravi.

4. On 26 December 1994, at 0915 hours, using a loader, Iraqi forces constructed a bunker near the geographical coordinates of NC 700-200 on the map of Helaleh, in no man's land, north of border pillar 36.

5. On 26 December 1994, at 1025 hours, an Iraqi helicopter was observed flying from south to north-west of Faw at the geographical coordinates of TP 522-196 on the map of Faw.

6. On 26 December 1994, at 1300 hours, two persons dressed in civilian clothes penetrated into the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran and began firing at Iranian forces at the geographical coordinates of NC 580-480 on the map of Sumar. Pursued by the Iranian border police, they fled into Iraqi territory. On their way back to Iraq, Iraqi forces began firing at the Iranian border police in order to protect the two persons.

7. On 27 December 1994, an Iraqi helicopter was observed flying near the geographical coordinates of TP 555-194 on the map of Faw.

8. On 28 December 1994, at 0330 hours, Iraqi forces fired several bullets into the airspace of the Islamic Republic of Iran from the geographical coordinates of NC 548-416 on the map of Sumar, west of border pillar 43, in no man's land. At 1125 hours, on the same day, they began firing for 10 minutes towards Iranian territory from the same geographical coordinates. The bullets landed at the geographical coordinates of NC 555-425 on the map of Sumar, north of border pillar 41, in the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

9. On 28 December 1994, at 1200 hours, 11 Iraqi forces were observed constructing a bunker near the geographical coordinates of NC 870-125 on the map of Helaleh, in no man's land, north of border pillar 35/3. They also fired 30 bullets into the air.

10. On 28 December 1994, 32 Iraqi motor boats with a total of 87 personnel were observed patrolling Arvand Rud.

11. On 29 December 1994, a bulldozer was used by Iraqi forces for conducting engineering activities near the geographical coordinates of PB 370-430 on the map of Kouhe-Tunnel, in no man's land, west of border pillar 25/9.

12. On 29 December 1994, at 1000 hours, a loader and bulldozer were used by Iraqi forces for conducting engineering activities near the geographical coordinates of TP 330-570 on the map of Khorramshahr, in no man's land, south of Minu Island.

13. On 29 December 1994, 16 Iraqi motor boats with a total of 40 personnel were observed patrolling Arvand Rud.

14. On 31 December 1994, at 1230 hours, Iraqi forces began firing towards the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran from the geographical coordinates of PB 327-466 on the map of Kouhe-Tunnel, in no man's land, between north-west of border pillar 26/8 and south of border pillar 26/9, east of the Chekkeh-Qamar sentry post. A shepherd's leg was injured as a result of the firing.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kamal KHARRAZI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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S/1995/220
24 March 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN EL SALVADOR

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted to the Security Council in compliance with resolution 961 (1994) of 23 November 1994, by which the Council, having decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) for one final period until 30 April 1995, requested me to present a report by 31 March on the fulfilment and completion of ONUSAL's mandate and on modalities for its withdrawal, to be completed by 30 April 1995.

2. In the same resolution, the Security Council reaffirmed the commitment undertaken by the United Nations to verify the full implementation of the peace accords; welcomed my intention to consider ways for the United Nations to discharge its remaining verification duties; and invited me "to prepare modalities for further assistance to El Salvador, within the framework of the peace accords, for the period after 30 April 1995".

3. As the members of the Security Council will recall, I last reported on ONUSAL on 31 October 1994 (S/1994/1212 and Add.1). On the basis of the Council's request in resolution 961 (1994) that I should keep it informed on a regular basis of the status of implementation of outstanding commitments and ONUSAL operations, I have since, in letters dated 16 December 1994, 31 January 1995 and 7 March 1995, informed the Council about the state of the parties' compliance with their commitments under the "Timetable for the implementation of the most important outstanding agreements" of 19 May 1994 (S/1994/612, annex). In a letter dated 6 February 1995 (S/1995/143), I also informed the Council about the arrangement that I propose to put in place in El Salvador, following the withdrawal of ONUSAL, to maintain the capacity of the United Nations to verify compliance with those parts of the peace accords whose implementation is still pending, in accordance with the commitment undertaken by the United Nations, as reaffirmed by the Council. On 17 February, the Security Council welcomed my proposal in this regard (see S/1995/144).

4. The present report, which describes the activities of ONUSAL during the period from 1 November 1994 to 20 March 1995, assesses the state of implementation of various aspects of the peace accords as ONUSAL's role in

El Salvador comes to an end. In addition to its introduction and my concluding observations, the report includes seven sections, devoted respectively to military aspects; public security aspects; human rights, the judicial system and the Commission on the Truth; electoral matters; economic and social issues; financial aspects; and administrative aspects.

II. MILITARY ASPECTS

5. From the start of its present mandate on 1 December 1994, ONUSAL has had a strength of 3 military observers, from Brazil, Spain and Venezuela, down from 21 at the beginning of the previous mandate. While military observers have participated in the Mission from the outset, their numbers have diminished steadily as the focus of their work has shifted from purely military-related matters to institutional reform and the reintegration of former combatants. A table showing the contributions in military personnel made by Member States since the beginning of ONUSAL in 1991 is annexed to the present report (see annex I).

6. After the signature of the Chapultepec agreements (S/23501, annex), there was a significant operational aspect of verification relating to the cessation of the armed conflict: the dismantling of the military structure of the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN), in exchange for the initiation of agreed reforms by the Government; and the dissolution of certain combat units within the Armed Forces. Despite some delays, caused mainly by the parties' reluctance to comply with certain obligations and by mutual mistrust, the successful conclusion of the cessation of the armed conflict underlined their commitment to peace.

7. A number of issues remained unresolved, however, which would resurface in 1993 and be overcome later in the process, with the help of ONUSAL. Resistance from within the Armed Forces considerably delayed the discharge of more than 100 high-ranking military officers, as recommended by the ad hoc commission set up in accordance with the agreements to evaluate their performance. The stronger reaction to the recommendations of the Commission on the Truth showed that the Armed Forces and other groups still held considerable power.

8. Also grave was the discovery that, in violation of its obligations under the agreements, FMLN had kept large quantities of weapons in hidden deposits in El Salvador and certain neighbouring countries. By calling into question the status of FMLN as a legal political party and raising issues of credibility, this development deflected attention from pending commitments and forestalled their timely implementation. For several months, ONUSAL military observers, with the information provided to them by FMLN, were actively engaged in the process of locating and destroying the illegal weapons caches.

9. Despite these set-backs, progress was made on the reduction and transformation of the Armed Forces and the readjustment of their mission in accordance with the peace accords. Their subordination to civilian rule, the concentration of their role on national defence rather than on internal security and the removal of internal intelligence functions from their mandate were firmly established through constitutional reforms. Civil defence and other

paramilitary bodies were dismantled, forcible recruitment was prohibited and a military and reserve service law was adopted.

10. While these institutional reforms were undertaken by the Government, resistance to change persisted. Thus, notwithstanding the dissolution of the military intelligence apparatus, the Joint Group for the Investigation of Politically Motivated Illegal Armed Groups, set up in December 1993, found that active members of the Armed Forces were in all likelihood still involved in internal intelligence activities. Although ONUSAL has found no evidence that this is an institutional policy, the possible use of this information-gathering capacity for political or common crimes is a matter for serious concern. A strengthening of the State Intelligence Agency, established under the direct authority of the President pursuant to the peace accords, would help to ensure that this important State function is kept within the civilian realm.

11. In order to ascertain the scope of the reduction of the Armed Forces, ONUSAL has requested more detailed information on their budget, their premises and facilities and the strength of their officer corps. Although the most important legislative measures deriving from the peace accords are in effect, some complementary measures are still required.

12. During this last mandate, ONUSAL's remaining military observers have closely monitored the adoption and implementation of legislative and administrative measures taken to collect military weapons in the hands of civilians or State institutions. While a limited number of registered arms are still to be collected, the main problem lies with the unknown but large number of weapons of which there is no record. The Government has reported the seizing of approximately 2,000 such weapons since the beginning of 1995, but voluntary surrender has thus far been negligible. This is a matter for concern which should be addressed promptly. Buy-back programmes such as those used in Nicaragua and Haiti might be considered.

III. PUBLIC SECURITY ASPECTS

13. Since 1 December 1994, ONUSAL has had a strength of 32 police observers, from Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Guyana, Italy, Mexico and Spain. The corresponding strength on 1 June 1994 was 201. Despite this reduction, the Police Division has continued to verify the performance and demobilization of the National Police and the training, deployment and operations of the National Civil Police. In addition, police observers support human rights observers and political affairs officers in various accords-related duties. A table showing the contributions in police personnel made by Member States since the outset of ONUSAL in 1991 is annexed to the present report (see annex II).

14. The creation of a new civilian police, separate from the Armed Forces, is one of the basic elements of the peace accords and probably one of their most ambitious goals. The security bodies formerly in existence - the National Police, the National Guard and the Customs Police - were part of the Armed Forces, subordinate to the Ministry of Defence, and received military training. During the armed conflict, these bodies served as an instrument for the exercise of military control over the population.

15. In the two years since its initial deployment, the National Civil Police has expanded steadily and has now taken over practically all security functions from the former security forces. It has a current strength of slightly more than 7,000 agents and approximately 220 middle and high-level officers, all of whom are graduates of the newly established National Public Security Academy, and are deployed throughout the country. It operates from the former National Police headquarters and has stations in all departments. It has a proper budgetary allocation which, with assistance from donor countries (mainly the United States of America and Spain), has ensured the provision of vehicles, weapons and communication equipment. This remarkable achievement notwithstanding, much remains to be done for the National Civil Police to become the effective, professional and fully reliable force envisaged in the peace accords.

16. The transition to a new civilian police has taken longer and been more difficult than originally conceived. The Government failed to anticipate the need for early measures, even before the peace accords were signed, to prepare for the transition. In addition to the magnitude of the task, resistance from certain sectors within the Armed Forces, from which the National Civil Police was to take over public security functions, adversely affected the training, organization and deployment of the new police force. Lack of cooperation and efforts to exert control over the National Civil Police were evident in several areas.

17. The failure to transfer the premises, equipment and other material resources of the former security bodies also contributed to the initial delay in the opening of the National Public Security Academy and explains why the first National Civil Police graduates were poorly equipped and lacked the means to carry out their duties effectively. Another source of problems was the reluctance to dismantle the old military command structures and efforts to transfer them to the National Civil Police, which would have severely distorted the original intention for the National Civil Police.

18. These problems with the former security bodies were further complicated when, following a direct agreement between the Government and FMLN, the former anti-narcotics and criminal investigations units were transferred en bloc to the National Civil Police and a military officer was placed in charge of its operational command until he resigned in April 1994. In accordance with ONUSAL's recommendations, 71 members of these units have been discharged since my October 1994 report, and measures have been taken to ensure that the units are properly subordinated to the command structure of the National Civil Police. Additionally, more than 200 anti-narcotics agents have voluntarily left the National Civil Police and received indemnities and over 100 members of the criminal investigations unit will follow soon. The staggered admission of the remaining members of both units to regular National Public Security Academy courses is scheduled to begin in April 1995.

19. The long-delayed demobilization of the National Police was formally and finally effected on 31 December 1994. The importance of this development should not be underestimated. As already reported to the Security Council, reluctance to dismantle this force and to provide information on its real strength had

given rise to apprehensions that there was an intention to maintain it. Demobilization started belatedly and gained speed only after June 1994.

20. After several delays, the dissolution of the Customs Police, which has a strength of approximately 1,000 members, started in mid-March and is expected to be completed by the end of the current month. ONUSAL has insisted that the reabsorption of these agents by the Ministry of Finance should be accompanied by the transfer of all their police functions to the National Civil Police Finance Division.

21. A joint committee, with ONUSAL's participation, has evaluated the remaining elements of the former National Police prior to their possible admission to basic-level courses at the National Public Security Academy, as had been agreed upon in the Timetable for the implementation of the most important outstanding agreements (S/1994/612, annex). As with members of the anti-narcotics and criminal investigations units, a large number of potential candidates have relinquished their right to apply to the Academy and are being paid indemnities. As a consequence, only some 100 have applied for admission to the Academy, which will be permitted only in full compliance with ONUSAL's recommendations.

22. The discharge of non-qualified members of the old security units and the dissolution of the Customs Police did not come without strong resistance. Protesters from the units concerned broke the law by carrying out serious acts of insubordination, going on strike and taking over their premises by force. Such behaviour tested the capacity of the still fragile National Civil Police to combat illegal acts. Although the anti-riot capacity of the National Civil Police has improved lately, it has been unable on various occasions to restrain disorderly conduct by violent demonstrators.

23. While the target of 5,700 National Public Security Academy graduates indicated in the peace accords as the minimum necessary to assume all police functions at the national level was achieved in September 1994, that strength has appeared at times to be insufficient in the face of the crime wave which has afflicted post-war El Salvador. In these circumstances, resort to the army for public security functions became easier. In November 1994, three deaths occurred when soldiers were called in to support the National Civil Police during a protest by bus owners. Further violence in recent weeks has led to a decision to use military patrols to deter crime in rural areas. This decision was not in compliance with the constitutional procedures established pursuant to the peace accords, according to which the Armed Forces may be used for public security purposes only if the National Civil Police has been found incapable of addressing a specific crisis, and the President may issue such an order only if it is accompanied by a notification to the Legislative Assembly. Although the patrols, which began operating on 14 March, are commanded and escorted by National Civil Police, this is a serious development which entails undeniable risks. The November incident illustrated the inadequacy of the Armed Forces, under normal circumstances, to perform public security functions. Further, it is necessary that a law be approved to specify the exceptional circumstances under which the Armed Forces can be used for public security and the limits of such use.

24. As provided for by law and recommended by ONUSAL, the National Public Security Academy has, for the first time since its inauguration, evaluated the performance of National Civil Police graduates. While their knowledge of all subjects was rated satisfactory in some 67 per cent of the cases examined, only 54 per cent reached that level on the key subjects of judicial procedures and use of firearms. This confirmed ONUSAL's earlier findings regarding the need to reinforce the relevant courses at the Academy.

25. Several other matters require attention. A campaign to promote civilian admissions into the Academy appears to have yielded only moderate results and is being reviewed by ONUSAL. The Government has requested that, as an exception to a provision in the 19 May 1994 Timetable, five former National Police officers be accepted as Academy candidates. FMLN has not agreed to this. The criteria and procedures for admission to the Academy should thus be reviewed and strengthened to improve the selection of candidates. The Academic Council's decision to intensify basic-level courses and to extend their duration from six to eight months should be put into effect. Of particular importance is the acceleration of training of specialized agents and officers, especially in the areas of criminal investigations, transit, public security and finance. Criminal investigations deserve special attention since professional quality, coupled with effective coordination with the Attorney-General's office and the judiciary, is the key element to combat crime and eradicate impunity.

26. The regulatory machinery of the National Civil Police also requires strengthening. While the Inspector-General has been appointed under the Vice-Ministry for Public Security and assigned material resources, a lack of clarity regarding his monitoring functions has made his performance ineffective. This is largely true also of the control and disciplinary investigations units. After a long delay, the latter has made progress on cases involving grave human rights violations by National Civil Police members and has been submitting its findings to the disciplinary tribunal for decision.

27. Legal voids still affect the functioning of the National Civil Police, mainly with regard to the approval of regulations for its Organic Law and the Police Career Law. These voids should be filled promptly. Given past experience of arbitrariness in the assignment of ranks, it is particularly important that a legal framework be provided for promotions within the force. Central planning, as part of a cohesive national public security policy, should also be established and a system should be devised which would not require police to live in barracks.

28. While well advanced, therefore, the transition to the full establishment of the National Civil Police as the sole institution performing police functions is still not complete.

IV. HUMAN RIGHTS, THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND THE COMMISSION ON THE TRUTH

29. Violations of fundamental human rights have declined markedly since ONUSAL began operations in 1991. Politically motivated killings have become rare and complaints of arbitrary detention have sharply diminished, while "disappearances" have stopped altogether. To consolidate this progress, however, the national institutions created or reformed by the peace accords and charged with protecting human rights, including the judiciary, the National Civil Police and the National Counsel for the Defence of Human Rights (Procuraduría), must still be substantially strengthened. Basic reforms in that regard, called for by the Commission on the Truth, are still pending.

30. After considerable delay, a new Supreme Court made up of eminent professionals was set up in 1994. Since taking office, the new Court has dismissed or suspended 11 judges for professional misconduct; reduced the number of detainees awaiting trial, who were estimated by ONUSAL in July 1994 to constitute 80 per cent of the prison population; and named a new Director of the Institute of Forensic Medicine, previously considered a partisan body. In its first major decision, the Court's Constitutional Chamber invoked international treaties ratified by El Salvador to declare that pre-trial detention should be the exception, rather than the virtual norm that it had become.

31. Reforms crucial to ensure that the Supreme Court's decisions are effectively implemented include: the adoption of the new criminal code and criminal procedures code; the decentralization of functions now carried out by the Supreme Court, which will allow the National Council of the Judiciary (Consejo Nacional de la Judicatura) to name and remove judges; the reform of the Career Judicial Service Act; the elimination of extrajudicial confessions; the facilitation of habeas corpus proceedings; and the abrogation of the 1886 Police Act.

32. To overcome the inadequate training of many of the current judges, it is essential to continue strengthening the Judicial Training School (Escuela de Capacitación Judicial), conceived in the peace accords as a necessary step for candidates for the judiciary. The recent appointment of a distinguished jurist to head the school is an encouraging beginning.

33. After a slow start, partly due to lack of funding, the National Counsel for the Defence of Human Rights, which was created in 1992 under the peace accords, has in the past year taken a more active role. With offices now established in each of El Salvador's 14 departments, it receives far more complaints than ONUSAL ever did, issues over 20 resolutions per month and has challenged official abuses more assertively. However, most officials still feel free to ignore the Counsel's non-binding recommendations and these are not always prepared with the necessary speed and precision. The office has also yet to take real advantage of its power to seek judicial remedies.

34. A key pillar of any democracy is a robust civil society including non-governmental human rights organizations. During the armed conflict, non-governmental organizations courageously called attention to abuses. As the worst violations have been reduced, these organizations have had to face a new

situation, to which some have adapted better than others. They now have to take advantage of the new political space to monitor the performance of State institutions and to promote respect for the rule of law.

35. Because abuses were still rampant, the initial emphasis of ONUSAL's Human Rights Division was on the monitoring of violations. As the situation improved, it was able to devote increasing resources to the strengthening of national institutions, including seminars and specialized workshops on human rights for the National Civil Police, the judiciary, the National Counsel for the Defence of Human Rights, the Armed Forces and non-governmental organizations. Since November 1994, a substantial part of the Division's staff has worked virtually full-time with that of the National Counsel for the Defence of Human Rights, analysing cases and jointly verifying complaints.

36. Institution-building continues to be crucial for the consolidation of the progress achieved in the protection of human rights. This is particularly important to overcome impunity, the greatest threat to human rights in El Salvador. A June 1994 study by the Division of Human Rights showed that in respect of the 75 most serious complaints presented to ONUSAL relating to homicides, attempted homicides and death threats over a two-year period, not one person had been convicted or sentenced (see S/1994/886, paras. 59-68). With this weakness in police investigations and judicial procedures, popular mistrust of or scepticism about these institutions have continued.

37. The assassination of several FMLN leaders also remains unresolved. The Joint Group for the Investigation of Politically Motivated Illegal Armed Groups made a number of important recommendations whose implementation could reduce impunity for both political and organized crime. These include the creation of special tribunals to hear such cases, as well as legislation authorizing the reduction of sentences in exchange for information leading to their resolution. The Joint Group's proposal that a special unit be created within the National Civil Police to investigate cases of political and organized crime has been implemented, but that unit has remained virtually inactive as it has only recently been provided with office space within the National Civil Police.

38. ONUSAL and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have, in cooperation, elaborated programmes to strengthen the Judicial Training School, establish a penitentiary-staff training school, examine the prison system, train prosecutors in investigation techniques, provide human rights courses to public defenders and justices of the peace, and improve the capacities of human rights non-governmental organizations.

39. The recommendations of the Commission on the Truth are binding upon the parties under the peace accords. Of particular importance, especially in the light of ONUSAL's withdrawal, are those steps which would enable Salvadorians whose rights have been violated to have access to the international protection system if domestic remedies fail. These include ratification of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which recognizes the competence of the Human Rights Committee set up under the Covenant to receive and consider complaints from individuals who have exhausted available domestic remedies; withdrawal of reservations to the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or

Punishment regarding the authority of the Committee against Torture to investigate systematic violations, as well as acceptance of the Committee's authority to hear individual complaints; and recognition of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.

V. ELECTORAL MATTERS

40. As the Security Council is aware, ONUSAL devoted considerable attention to the monitoring and observation of the presidential, legislative and municipal elections of 20 March 1994 and to the second round of presidential elections on 24 April. The Mission's Electoral Division, established in September 1993, verified and supported the voter registration process and observed the electoral campaign and the elections (see S/26606, S/1994/179, S/1994/304, S/1994/375 and S/1994/486).

41. In May 1994, after the elections, I reported to the Security Council (see S/1994/536, para. 17) that there was an evident need for a thorough reform of the electoral system, which should address the following aspects: introduction of a single identity document; provision for voting in the area of residence of the voter; standardization of the formula for representation in the Assembly and municipalities; and depoliticization of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal.

42. In January of this year, a presidentially appointed commission of members from various parties recommended issuance of a single identity document by an autonomous entity outside the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and implementation of residential voting. In February, a United Nations technical assistance mission made a series of related recommendations. Commendable interest has been expressed in these matters by the Government and political parties. But, given the need for legislative changes and the scope of this task, issuance of a new document may not be completed in time for the 1997 legislative and municipal elections. Modification of the "first-past-the-post" system for municipal councils has yet to be addressed by the presidential commission and the political parties, but the expectation is that it will be included, together with the identity document and residential voting, in any package of reforms that may be considered by the Legislative Assembly in the coming months.

43. Unfortunately, as stated on previous occasions (see S/1994/1212, para. 13), politicization continues to undermine the performance and credibility of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. The implementation of the 1991 constitutional reforms has not led to the effective functioning of this institution. This is illustrated by the fact that, with the next elections still at a distance, magistrates are already deadlocked over routine questions of personnel. I appeal to the Government and political parties to summon the political will to address this issue and thereby contribute to the efficient and professional administration of future elections and the increased public confidence this would bring.

VI. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES

A. Land-transfer programme

44. Since my last report to the Security Council, 5,420 beneficiaries have received title to land. The total of beneficiaries to date is 18,362, representing only 45 per cent of the 40,648 former members of the Armed Forces and of FMLN, as well as landholders in former zones of conflict, who are the "universe" of potential beneficiaries agreed in August 1994 (see S/1994/1000, para. 28). The programme for former members of the Armed Forces remains even more seriously delayed than that for FMLN. The land programme thus continues to be cause for serious concern. With the decentralization process established in the third acceleration plan (see S/1994/1000, para. 30) and the change in the presidency of the Lands Bank, the land programme had shown marked progress from the end of October to the end of December 1994, increasing the number of beneficiaries by 4,251 (about 70 per day). However, the programme came to a complete halt in mid-January 1995. Although it has now resumed, it has been significantly slower in the first two months of this year than in the last two of 1994. This is worrisome given the Government's assurances that it would greatly accelerate during this period. Only 1,169 beneficiaries (20 per day) have received land so far this year.

45. Several factors contributed to the acceleration of the programme in November-December 1994: (a) the adoption of a decree to facilitate the procedure for legalization and titling of land; (b) more firms working in land measurement; (c) the positive attitude of the new presidency of the Lands Bank; (d) new administrative measures; (e) decentralization of the process to the regions; and (f) recruitment of 108 members of FMLN to help in contacting owners and assisting potential beneficiaries to comply with programme requirements. It was unfortunate that the programme became paralysed again in January 1995, partly because of the holidays but more importantly because of further administrative changes in the Lands Bank, which included the replacement of 30 key employees deeply involved in the process.

46. A second reason for the paralysis was the involvement of the Institute for Liberty and Progress as part of the fourth acceleration plan adopted in November 1994. Although endowed with more sophisticated capacity and resources than others, the Institute has found it difficult at this late stage to adapt quickly to the needs of the land programme, especially as most of its previous experience related to titling of housing in urban areas in which there was a fairly reliable registry and census of properties and relatively easy access. In addition, rural properties give rise to problems relating to (a) measurement; (b) finding original owners; and (c) finding witnesses to certify ownership. The involvement of the Institute has also led to serious coordination problems with the Lands Bank and the Coordinating Office for Agricultural Issues, which was playing a critical role at the regional level. Furthermore, high expectations raised by the inclusion of the Institute in the effort to accelerate titling have so far gone largely unfulfilled, with concomitant resentment and impatience on the part of potential beneficiaries. Although the original idea was that the Lands Bank would subcontract to the Institute in order to facilitate the titling and the binding by deed of land in cases where

problems existed, the Institute has now assumed executive functions over much of the programme.

47. Despite earlier assertions by government officials that the land programme would be completed by 30 April, this is now recognized to be impossible. Indeed, it is hard to imagine that the programme will be completed before the end of 1995. It is therefore imperative that the decree protecting landholders from eviction be extended accordingly and as soon as possible to minimize the insecurity and anxiety of landholders (see S/1994/561, para. 74), and that the issuance of land certificates be expedited. The 55 per cent of potential beneficiaries who have not yet received land are problematic cases with one or more of the following characteristics: (a) minifundio land tenure (problem of dealing with a large number of landowners; difficulty of titling a large number of properties rather than a few); (b) legal problems (lack of land title, inheritance problems of owners); and (c) need to relocate to other available and acceptable properties landholders currently on properties whose owners do not want to sell.

48. The Government has reinstated key personnel at the regional level and has addressed some of the coordination problems discussed above. Much more, however, needs to be done in this regard.

49. Another problem has been that payments to landowners are often unnecessarily delayed. This is discouraging others from selling, thereby contributing to the need to relocate landholders. In cases where there are legal difficulties in completing the process, payment could be made into an escrow account, which would facilitate the transfer. The Government has proposed such a measure and should make every effort to ensure that it is acted upon without delay.

50. Another matter of great concern is the situation of human settlements. As I have been informing the Security Council since November 1993 (see S/26790, para. 55; S/1994/561, paras. 76 and 87; S/1994/1000, paras. 28 and 31; and S/1994/1212, para. 17), the political and social consequences of breaking up these communities cannot be underestimated. I regret to have to report that hardly any progress has been made in finding a solution to this potentially explosive problem, which has led to repeated incidents between landowners who want to recover their land and the landholders occupying it.

51. An agreement had already been reached with regard to urban human settlements. This has not been implemented, however, because of differences regarding potential beneficiaries. FMLN requests housing grants for all persons included in the 1993 National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ) census of urban settlements. The Government insists that those within the land programme (about 750 of the 1,370 in the COPAZ census) should not be entitled to the housing grant, which amounts to $1,380. FMLN argues that all those in human settlements should receive this amount since they are not likely to leave the community because of the infrastructure and services they would lose.

52. Furthermore, some of these communities want to be represented on their own and not by FMLN (some having been represented by the Expresión Renovadora del

Pueblo (ERP), and others being disillusioned by the FMLN leadership because of its inability to find a solution to the problem).

53. It is imperative that a solution to bridge the gap between FMLN's demands and what the Government is offering be found quickly and in any case before ONUSAL leaves El Salvador. The small team that will remain for verification purposes will not be as well equipped as ONUSAL to play a facilitating role in finding a solution to this issue. Transfer of these settlements will not be possible through the complex procedures of the land programme. If both parties exercise maximum flexibility, the best strategy would be to transfer quickly as many as possible of the properties whose owners want to sell and to leave to the end those whose owners cannot be found, have legal problems, ask an unreasonable price or do not want to sell. At that time, a scheme of expropriation with compensation, as contemplated in the Constitution, may have to be considered in some cases where the property involved is communal in nature.

54. As reflected above, the issue of financing is not the most critical to full implementation of the agreements, although it remains important. The Government's recent agreement with the association of former members of the Armed Forces (ADEFAES) to facilitate benefits to 5,000 members of that organization raises disturbing questions given the scarcity of funds and land available for reintegration programmes and the need to discourage the impression that benefits can be obtained by resorting to force. This makes it all the more necessary to ensure early delivery on delayed programmes for potential beneficiaries who have legitimate expectations under the peace accords.

B. Other reintegration programmes

55. Although progress can be reported in a number of reintegration programmes and a few have been completed, it remains necessary to accelerate the outstanding ones and to correct existing deficiencies.

56. Contrary to earlier reports, the transfer of $13 million to the Agricultural Credit Bank to finance agricultural programmes has not yet taken place. Only $4.5 million have been transferred as a first instalment. It is essential to overcome the delays in expanding the Bank's administrative capacity to forestall the risk of falling behind the allocation of credits. Those who have received title to land, and undertaken the debt burden this implies, must receive credit in time to plant, produce and service their debts. Since many are afraid of becoming further indebted, adequate technical assistance needs to be provided so that they utilize the credit productively.

57. The Government therefore needs to take immediate action to remedy the delays that have occurred. Disbursement of credit must begin without delay if producers are to take advantage of the planting season starting in April-May. Most FMLN former combatants, but only 40 per cent of those from the Armed Forces, have already received credit. Inadequacy of technical assistance adds to the problem and many landholders are reluctant to become further indebted. As a result, only 2,500 landholders of a total of potential beneficiaries of over 22,000 have so far had access to credit.

58. Most micro-enterprise credit has already been disbursed, but it has been estimated that only 26 per cent of FMLN recipients and 51 per cent of former members of the Armed Forces have invested the credit productively. It has also been estimated that only 16 per cent of FMLN recipients and 30 per cent of former members of the Armed Forces are making timely payments on the interest due. The "Plan 600" for medium-level FMLN former commanders, who received more training, orientation and technical assistance, has shown better results in terms of investment and repayment. While the housing programme for the 600 former commanders belonging to this group is scheduled to start at the end of the current month, no progress has been made in the case of former members of the Armed Forces.

59. The Fund for the Protection of the Wounded and War-Disabled as a Consequence of the Armed Conflict (see S/26790, para. 70) also remains problematic, having experienced more delays than almost any other. The Fund faces pressing demands and a manifest lack of resources and administrative capacity. Although it has recently received some support from the Government, it is still not in a position to discharge its functions effectively. First payments were made in the form of pensions to the most severely disabled. The gap between the position of the war-disabled and that of the Government continues to widen. The organization of disabled former FMLN combatants no longer accepts to be represented by that party. Reintegration of almost 12,000 war-disabled and assistance to approximately 18,000 war victims are critically needed.

60. As of the end of February 1995, almost 19,000 demobilized former combatants of the Armed Forces had received compensation payments (equivalent to 12-months' salary). Reintegration programmes for the former agents of the National Police have been more integrated and better coordinated than similar programmes for the Armed Forces. This was partly because of more experienced executing agencies but principally because the higher educational levels of beneficiaries permitted more informed vocational choices and allowed them to benefit more from existing programmes. A total of 4,364 former agents have received counselling. Ninety per cent opted for vocational training and scholarships, while the remaining 10 per cent preferred agricultural training. Complementary programmes to stabilize and/or refinance the existing projects of beneficiaries and further technical assistance are clearly needed to guarantee the effective reintegration of former combatants. ONUSAL and UNDP are cooperating closely to this end.

C. Forum for Economic and Social Consultation

61. The Forum for Economic and Social Consultation focused essentially on labour rights issues during its 14 months of existence (see S/1994/561, paras. 88-91). The approval of 14 International Labour Organization conventions and the reform of the labour code were among its main achievements. As I have informed the Security Council (see S/26790, para. 60), Forum sessions were interrupted in December 1993 when the business sector declared that it would discontinue work during the March 1994 electoral campaign. They have not been resumed.

62. On 21 April 1994, the reforms to the labour code entered into force, including the creation of the High Labour Council (Consejo Superior del Trabajo). Since that time, the business sector has argued that the Council as a legal and permanent institution replaces the Forum, an interim entity created by the peace accords. Several unions continue to insist on the reinstallation of the Forum and FMLN included it among pending accords in the 19 May 1994 Timetable. In December 1994, the internal regulations of the High Labour Council were published and the Council was inaugurated on 6 March 1995, nearly nine months after its creation. The representation of the business sector is unchanged from that in the Forum and unions on both sides of the debate regarding reinstallation of the Forum are representing the labour sector. The exclusion of certain Government ministries formerly represented in the Forum suggests, however, that the Council's agenda is likely to be significantly narrower than that of the Forum.

VII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

63. The Security Council, by its resolution 961 (1994), decided, inter alia, to extend the mandate of ONUSAL for one final period from 1 December 1994 to 30 April 1995. Commitment authorization has been provided in the amount of $1 million per month for the period from 1 December 1994 to 31 March 1995. Requirements for the period ending 30 April 1995 will be presented to the General Assembly.

64. As at 17 March 1995, unpaid assessed contributions to the ONUSAL special account since the inception of the Mission (including the United Nations Observer Group for Central America (ONUCA)) amounted to $23,649,501. In order to provide ONUSAL with the necessary cash-flow, a total of $10.5 million was borrowed from other peace-keeping accounts. These loans remain unpaid. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peace-keeping operations on 17 March 1995 were $1,678.7 million.

VIII. ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS

65. As regards the disposition of United Nations assets held by ONUSAL, the transfer of vehicles, equipment, furniture and supplies to other Missions and United Nations organizations commenced in June 1994. By February 1995, nearly all assets not directly required by the smaller team remaining during the current mandate period had been disposed of by transfer or commercial sale. Complete listings of both expendable and non-expendable items that will be retained until the end of the mandate have been prepared and will form the basis of decisions on further transfers, particularly to operations such as the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) and the United Nations Human Rights Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA), and as start-up kits for storage at Brindisi, Italy.

66. The process of liquidating ONUSAL's assets is being guided by the principles and policies described in the Financial Rules and Regulations of the United Nations and in administrative instructions which, in order of priority, provide that (a) equipment that conforms to established standards or is

compatible with existing equipment should be redeployed to other United Nations operations or placed in reserve for use by future missions; (b) other equipment should be offered to other United Nations organizations in the country, for transfer to them at depreciated values; (c) other items should be disposed of commercially within the country, in accordance with standard United Nations procedures; and (d) any remaining assets (of small unit value and usually in poor condition) can be donated to local organizations.

67. The official closure of ONUSAL will take place at the end of April 1995, but it will be necessary to retain in El Salvador a small team of United Nations civilian personnel to deal with outstanding claims, invoices, boards of inquiry, etc., and to handle the final disposal of property and equipment. This team, which will be distinct from the small team referred to in my letter of 6 February 1995 to the President of the Security Council (S/1995/143), will be expected to complete its work as quickly as possible, and in any case not later than the end of July 1995. Thereafter, I will be in a position to present to the competent United Nations bodies a final report on the liquidation of ONUSAL's assets.

IX. OBSERVATIONS

68. At the present time, preparations to dismantle ONUSAL are well under way. The United Nations will shortly be closing down a paradigmatic, multifunctional peace-keeping operation 45 months after the opening of the pioneering human rights-monitoring mission that was its initial stage and 39 months after the formal cease-fire that accompanied full deployment. There is much reason for satisfaction at what has been accomplished by the Salvadorians during this time. ONUSAL can take credit for having helped the Salvadorians to take giant strides away from a violent and closed society towards a democratic order where institutions for the protection of human rights and free discourse are being consolidated. However, a number of commitments remain still to be fulfilled before the Salvadorian peace process can be pronounced a success. Unfortunately, these commitments pertain to aspects of the peace accords which are of such importance that they will call into question the irreversibility of the peace process as a whole as long as they are unfulfilled. Indeed, some of them are potentially explosive and need to be defused urgently.

69. The United Nations undertook to verify the implementation of all agreements reached by the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN signatories of the peace agreement signed at Chapultepec Castle in Mexico City on 16 January 1992 (S/23501, annex). As has been pointed out in the body of this report, a number of the solemn commitments undertaken at Chapultepec remain to be honoured. On this basis, a strong case could have been made for maintaining ONUSAL after 30 April 1995, the date of final expiry of its mandate. A recommendation to that effect was given serious consideration but I refrained from making it in the light of the clear indications from members of the Council that the time had come to bring ONUSAL to a close.

70. It was against this background that I informed the Council on 6 February 1995 that, following the withdrawal of ONUSAL, I proposed to leave behind a small team that would conduct the remaining verification and

good-offices responsibilities of the United Nations. I am grateful for the Security Council's favourable response to my proposal. The need to put this mechanism in place and to make sure that it is able to carry out its difficult task, albeit with extremely reduced means, is critical to the consolidation of peace in El Salvador. When I put my intention to the Council, assurances were being given that substantial progress would take place before 30 April 1995. The modest proposal that I made for the size of the post-ONUSAL team was predicated on this premise, which regrettably has not materialized. Subsequent delays and new difficulties may warrant a somewhat larger team.

71. The last year has seen changes within both parties to the peace accords. These changes do not affect the binding nature of the original accords. President Calderón Sol attained his office through elections whose legitimacy was enhanced by the reforms that followed the peace accords and the participation of the United Nations. His Government, therefore, bears a direct and heavy responsibility, which the President has fully accepted, to ensure that all undertakings arising from the accords are fulfilled with the least possible delay.

72. Although the FMLN participated in the 1994 elections as a single political party, soon afterwards two of its five constituent groups - the Expresión Renovadora del Pueblo and the Resistencia Nacional - separated themselves from the other three - the Fuerzas Populares de Liberación, the Partido Comunista and the Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores Centro-Americanos - in order to establish distinct political parties. As an entity, however, FMLN retains its status as one of the signatories of the peace accords. During the peace talks with the Government, the FMLN's five groups formed a joint negotiating organization. The peace accords were signed on behalf of FMLN by representatives of these five groups. These groups continue to constitute the Government's counterpart in negotiations concerning the implementation of the peace accords.

73. The process of peaceful transition to a more democratic society has not gone unchallenged. There has been a manipulation of social demands; a campaign to discredit new State institutions, particularly the National Civil Police; a rise in common crime typical of post-war situations; and isolated but persistent calls for a growing military role which could undermine the credibility and authority of the National Civil Police and the political system as a whole.

74. The incident in late January, in which members of an organization of former soldiers were promised a package of benefits following their forcible takeover of the Legislative Assembly, underscored anew the need to comply speedily with commitments undertaken. If this is done, the Government will be better able to respond firmly to cyclical outbursts of violence in pursuit of further benefits.

75. Although the parties to the peace accords have been engaged, since the beginning of implementation, in a constant dialogue aimed at reaching agreement on ways to ensure compliance with their commitments, opposition from important pressure groups and continuing institutional fragility have forestalled decisive Government action in some particularly important areas, such as accession to international human rights instruments and, to a significant extent, the land-transfer programme and pending electoral reform. It is of utmost

importance that for the time remaining before the departure of ONUSAL, priority be assigned to implementation of the accords, beginning with those depending only on a decision by the Executive. It is for the Executive to ensure that its political decisions are duly implemented by those responsible.

76. Thus, at the close of the Mission, various important obligations are pending. The strengthening of the National Civil Police, and particularly of its investigative capacity and internal disciplinary mechanisms, is essential to provide protection from crime and to punish it in an effective manner, while at the same time ensuring that public security falls within civilian competence, as provided in the agreements. The continued purification and modernization of the judiciary is crucial to the protection of the rule of law and the eradication of impunity. The still pending adoption and ratification of international human rights instruments, as recommended by the Commission on the Truth, would extend the benefits of protection mechanisms in the event of possible future abuses. Efforts to ensure that the pending reforms of electoral legislation are approved well before the end of September 1995 will be needed if they are to be in place before the next elections.

77. The land programme continues to be a source of serious concern. More than half of the potential beneficiaries have not yet received title to their land. Most worrying, problems in the provision of agricultural credit could prevent a large number of them from planting in May. A special effort to overcome the roadblocks in the programme and to ensure that all those entitled to credit receive it in time is needed.

78. It is equally important that the parties reach agreement on modalities for the transfer of human settlements and that they move forward without delay in this regard. I urge the parties to find a solution to this politically explosive problem before ONUSAL leaves the country, since the small team that will remain in place will be much less able to contribute to this complex exercise.

79. The inability of the Fund for the Protection of the Wounded and War-Disabled to function because of lack of funds and administrative incapacity remains a potential source of unrest. Assisting the large numbers of war-disabled and war victims is a pressing humanitarian need which remains largely unattended three years after the conflict came to an end. An ominous development is the announcement by the war-disabled that because of their dissatisfaction with FMLN's lack of success, they now insist on dealing with the Government on their own or resorting to other means to obtain satisfaction.

80. It is not surprising, against this background, that pressures from FMLN for implementation have mounted in this phase of the process. Plans for street demonstrations, announced by the FMLN leadership, have been termed a threat and even "blackmail", despite assurances that they will be peaceful in nature. FMLN has been in contact with the authorities as well as ONUSAL to forewarn them of planned demonstrations, a right protected by the Constitution, so as to avoid untoward incidents. Grass-roots-level frustration as manifested by resort to demonstrations should be taken as a warning of the dangers of further delay in implementing agreements.

81. Under the peace accords, the role of COPAZ and its subcommissions is to supervise the implementation of the peace accords. COPAZ is composed mainly of representatives of the parties. While it had planned to conclude its work on 30 April 1995, the target established in the Timetable of 19 May 1994 for the completion of implementation, it is now considering ways to extend its functions on pending aspects, in conformity with the New York Agreement of September 1991 by which it was established and according to which it would remain in existence until all agreements are fully implemented. COPAZ, as the national institution for verifying implementation of the peace accords, should remain in existence as long as such implementation is pending.

82. The mechanism I propose to set up upon the withdrawal of ONUSAL will consist of a small team of professionals, with support staff, to verify compliance with pending aspects of the peace accords and provide good offices. The team will report to me and I will keep the Council informed as necessary. Building on the close cooperation established between ONUSAL and UNDP, I intend to ensure continued cooperation between UNDP and the follow-up mission in order to ensure an integrated approach in the post-conflict peace-building phase.

83. As will have been seen from the above, the areas that require verification are the completion of agreements regarding land transfer and other reintegration programmes, the approval of legislative measures recommended by the Commission on the Truth and the strengthening of the National Civil Police, the National Counsel for the Defence of Human Rights, the judiciary and the electoral system.

84. The withdrawal of ONUSAL marks the end of a presence which has provided strong support for peace and democratization in El Salvador. We are now entering a period during which Salvadorian institutions, strengthened and reformed pursuant to the peace accords, will have to assume their responsibilities in full. It is to be hoped that the legislative action required to consolidate these institutions will be rapidly taken and acted upon. The United Nations stands ready to lend assistance in this regard.

85. It has been clear for some time now that implementation of all pending agreements cannot be completed before the expiry of ONUSAL's mandate on 30 April. It is possible, however, to identify a number of those pending agreements which can be completed or on which important progress towards completion can be set in train. If obligations entailing processes are well on their way to full compliance and have acquired a sustained pace of execution by 30 April, I am confident that the small team that will remain in El Salvador beyond that date will be able to perform its verification mandate effectively.

86. In conclusion, I would like to pay a well-deserved tribute to my Special Representative in El Salvador, Mr. Enrique ter Horst, to his predecessors in that position, and to the men and women of ONUSAL, both military and civilian, for their energy and skill in establishing this pioneering, multifaceted operation of the United Nations and for the contribution they have made to the restoration of peace and stability in El Salvador.

Annex I

Contributions of military observers by Member States

Quarter ending	Argentina	Brazil	Canada	Columbia	Ecuador	India	Ireland	Spain	Sweden	Venezuela	Total
December 1991	0	3	1	0	3	0	0	5	0	3	15
March 1992	8	43	17	8	42	7	4	124	4	38	295
June 1992	8	47	11	8	32	7	4	125	4	40	286
September 1992	8	47	11	8	3	5	2	121	4	37	246
December 1992	7	45	10	6	3	2	2	119	3	29	226
March 1993	7	18	5	5	8	0	2	36	3	17	101
June 1993	7	3	2	5	8	2	2	11	2	4	46
September 1993	7	4	2	2	5	2	2	8	2	4	38
December 1993	4	4	2	2	5	2	2	8	2	3	34
March 1994	4	4	2	2	0	2	2	11	2	3	32
June 1994	4	4	2	2	0	0	0	6	1	2	21
September 1994	2	3	0	2	0	0	0	4	1	3	15
December 1994	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	3
March 1995	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	3

Annex II

Contributions of police observers by Member States

Quarter ending	Austria	Brazil	Colombia	Chile	Spain	France	Guyana	Italy	Mexico	Norway	Sweden	Total
December 1991	0	0	0	0	8	9	0	10	0	0	0	27
March 1992	3	0	0	0	116	30	0	9	113	3	5	279
June 1992	3	0	0	25	115	30	10	9	113	3	5	313
September 1992	3	0	0	26	114	27	10	9	111	3	5	308
December 1992	3	0	0	25	109	28	10	10	109	3	2	299
March 1993	3	0	0	25	108	17	10	10	108	3	2	286
June 1993	3	15	14	28	105	22	10	10	107	0	0	314
September 1993	3	15	34	28	106	22	8	12	97	0	2	327
December 1993	3	15	33	28	105	22	8	10	49	0	2	275
March 1994	3	14	33	28	102	21	8	10	49	0	2	270
June 1994	2	10	28	23	82	1	6	9	39	0	1	201
September 1994	2	2	21	15	64	1	4	8	29	0	1	147
December 1994	0	1	2	5	16	0	1	3	4	0	0	32
March 1995	0	1	2	5	16	0	1	3	4	0	0	32

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27 March 1995

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Item 92 of the preliminary list*
THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES OF CROATIA

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fiftieth year

Letter dated 22 March 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Croatia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter dated 22 March 1995 from the President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, addressed to you.

I would kindly request your assistance in distributing this letter and its annex as a document of the fiftieth session of the General Assembly under item 92 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mario NOBILO
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* A/50/50.

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ANNEX

Letter dated 22 March 1995 from the President of Croatia addressed to the Secretary-General

I would like to state the position of the Republic of Croatia with regard to the Vance plan (S/23280, annex III) for Croatia of 1991.

As we are both aware, the Vance plan has fulfilled but one small part of its goals: apart from the - at least formal - withdrawal of the former JNA forces from the territory of Croatia, nothing else has been achieved: the heavy weapons of the "Serbian Territorial Defence Forces" are not kept under United Nations control in storage depots; United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) have not been demilitarized, nor have the paramilitary units within them been disbanded; the human rights of members of the non-Serbian population within the UNPAs are being constantly violated; not a single refugee has returned home, to the contrary - as you are aware - some 600 Croats and other non-Serbs have been killed and 12,000 forcibly displaced from UNPAs while under United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) supervision.

I would like to emphasize that the Vance plan was an interim arrangement; it was to remain in force "in certain areas of Croatia" until an "overall settlement" or a "political solution" was found and the European Community came up with a viable peace plan. The Republic of Croatia has on many occasions reiterated that - following Security Council resolutions 815 (1993), 871 (1993), and 947 (1994), and General Assembly resolution 49/43 - the solution has clearly been defined: the negotiations on the conclusion of the conflict can take place only on the basis of respect for the territorial and legal framework of the Republic of Croatia.

The Vance plan has been overtaken by the developments on the ground. The introduction of "pink zones" (to which the Republic of Croatia has, upon your own assessment (S/24188), agreed voluntarily), the emergence of "blue zones" after the Zagreb Agreement of 29 March 1994, and the Economic Agreement have altered the overall framework for the "solution", and made the Vance plan largely irrelevant. In our view, these developments and the present situation have even rendered the Vance plan an obstacle for earnest negotiations within the Republic of Croatia.

General Assembly resolution 49/43 has determined a generic term for all of the territory of the Republic of Croatia that is not under effective control of the Croatian Government: occupied territories of Croatia. The use of the term "United Nations Protected Areas" cannot be justified any more. The "political solution" is not pending; the only aspect to be decided upon is how the occupied territories shall be reincorporated into the political and legal system of the Republic of Croatia. For Croatia, only the positive, and so far unfulfilled elements of the Vance plan and other agreements should remain as a mechanism for peace. But considering the fact that the UNPROFOR mission is withdrawing and its mandate terminating, the vehicle that launched the operation and its terminology cannot remain behind.

Within this in mind, I have the honour to inform you that the Republic of Croatia shall continue to honour the basic principles of the Vance plan, but finds it cannot serve as a legal or political basis for a new peace-keeping mission that is about to be launched in Croatia, and subsequently considers it to be null and void.

On the basis of the above, the Republic of Croatia hereby considers that our acceptance of the Vance plan, which was transmitted to the United Nations in my letter of 6 February 1992 (S/23592, annex I), is no longer binding.

(Signed) Dr. Franjo TUDJMAN
President of the Republic of Croatia

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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S/1995/222
22 March 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 947 (1994)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In paragraph 2 of its resolution 947 (1994), the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) for an additional period of six months terminating on 31 March 1995. The present report is intended, in conjunction with the report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 4 of resolution 947 (1994) (S/1995/38) dated 14 January 1995, to assist the Council in its consideration of the mandate of UNPROFOR.

II. STRUCTURE OF UNPROFOR

2. UNPROFOR is headed by my Special Representative, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, and includes military, civil affairs (including civilian police), public information and administrative components. Its headquarters is in Zagreb, Croatia. As of 20 March 1995, the strength of the military component, commanded by the Force Commander, Lieutenant-General Bernard Janvier of France, amounted to 38,599, including 684 United Nations military observers from 39 countries. (See annex III.) It is divided into three operational commands: UNPROFOR (Croatia) led by Major-General Eid Kamel Al-Rodan of Jordan, UNPROFOR (Bosnia and Herzegovina) led by Lieutenant-General Rupert Smith of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and UNPROFOR (former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) led by Brigadier-General Juha Engstrom of Finland. The Head of Civil Affairs reports to my Special Representative and is responsible for the civil affairs component which also includes 803 civilian police. There are 2,017 other international civilian staff (including 1,526 contractual personnel who are not members of the international civil service) and 2,615 local staff.

III. CROATIA

A. The cease-fire agreement

3. Since my interim report to the Council of 14 January 1995 (S/1995/38), there has been a significant escalation in military activity and tension between the two sides. Violations of the cease-fire agreement have increased from 133 on 12 January 1995 to 218 on 7 March 1995. The climate of uncertainty since the announcement of the decision of the Croatian Government on 12 January 1995 to withdraw its support for UNPROFOR's continuing role after the expiry of the present mandate was compounded by the decision of the self-proclaimed Serb Assembly in Knin on 8 March 1995 to declare a state of "immediate war alert", which is the last step preceding full mobilization. Tension manifested itself in defensive preparations by both parties, including the construction of extensive trench works, the limited deployment of artillery and other heavy weapons from weapons storage sites to tactical positions and the increased presence of formed groups of soldiers within the zone of separation. There has been a marked lack of cooperation with UNPROFOR military units in the zone of separation and increased restrictions of movement on United Nations military observers in sensitive and tactically important areas. Promising local initiatives, launched in December 1994, for restoring compliance with the cease-fire agreement in Sector East have been reversed and increased military training exercises have been noted. Of particular concern has been the tactical deployment undertaken by both sides in order to be able to seize strategic ground in the zone of separation in anticipation of UNPROFOR ceasing its functions on 31 March 1995.

4. These developments represent a clear warning that, without the continued maintenance of stability between the parties in the zone of separation, the cease-fire agreement will unravel. Also of great concern are the military alliances that have been formed in the area, including the Joint Defence Council established between the Krajina Serb and Bosnian Serb armies on 19 February 1995 and the formation of the Joint Defence Council between the Croatian Government and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 6 March 1995.

5. As military tension and uncertainty have increased, so have the anxiety and apprehension of residents in and near the zone of separation, particularly the minorities in the United Nations protected areas (UNPAs). Some 28,000 Croats are estimated to have remained in the areas, and approximately 5,000 Serbs live in the Croatian-administered section of UNPA Sector West. It should be noted that UNPROFOR has played a major role in protecting the rights of minorities in the protected areas and the Croat population there has been relatively stable since the cease-fire agreement, with fewer than 100 Croats seeking assistance to depart to Croatian-administered territory, mainly for family or medical reasons. While UNPROFOR has been successful in reducing crimes against minorities, it has been approached recently by hundreds of Croats requesting their immediate transfer to Croatian-administered areas should UNPROFOR depart.

6. Despite the increase in military tension, both sides have continued publicly to maintain their commitment to a peaceful resolution of their differences, and, for the past year, the cease-fire agreement has held remarkably well under the circumstances. United Nations civilian police

monitors (UNCIVPOL) have conducted over 13,000 patrols in the zone of separation since June 1994.

B. The economic agreement

7. The maintenance of the cease-fire agreement has been the essential foundation for the negotiation and implementation of the economic agreement. Despite the Croatian Government's announcement on 12 January 1995, both sides continued to cooperate fully in implementing the economic agreement until the decision of the self-proclaimed Serb Assembly in Knin on 8 February to postpone further negotiations and implementation - except for continued cooperation regarding the Zagreb-Lipovac highway and the oil pipeline through UNPA Sector North - until UNPROFOR's future presence in the protected areas was assured.

8. Prior to 8 February 1995, there was an impressive acceleration of both the negotiating process between the parties and the implementation of the economic agreement. Since 21 December 1994, over 200,000 vehicles have used the Zagreb-Lipovac highway, bringing substantial personal and economic improvements to both sides, with only a few sporadic incidents marring safe passage for increasing numbers of travellers. One hundred and forty UNCIVPOL monitors have conducted over 2,500 patrols along the highway, which is also protected in UNPA Sector West by 125 UNPROFOR military personnel. On 20 January 1995, the generator poles of the Obrovac hydroelectric station were returned to the Serb side, an essential step towards the restoration of electricity production in the area. On 26 January 1995, the oil pipeline was opened through UNPA Sector North, creating the possibility of significant revenue for Croatia from the transshipment of oil to Central European customers. On 27 January 1995, the first meeting of the Economic Joint Commission, co-chaired by representatives from the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and UNPROFOR, took place in Knin and agreed on the accelerated implementation of key economic projects, including the Zagreb-Okucani railway, on which mine-clearing operations commenced on 4 February 1995.

9. UNPROFOR personnel, including civil affairs staff and military engineers, were instrumental in setting up working-level meetings, arranging for exchanges of technical documents, conducting technical inspections and developing concepts of operations for 12 water and electricity rehabilitation projects. On the basis of technical inspections, it was estimated that, with full cooperation from both sides and moderate additional financial resources, the Petrinje-Sisak waterworks could have been fully restored by the end of February 1995, the Okucani railway could have been operational by 31 March 1995, and towns along the Dalmatian coast, including Zadar and Biograd, would have had adequate water supplies by this summer for the first time in four years.

10. Following the decision of the self-proclaimed Serb Assembly in Knin on 8 February 1995, my Special Representative as well as the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference made repeated efforts to resume implementation of the economic agreement and to continue direct negotiations between the parties. So far these efforts have not been successful, but preparatory work has continued by both sides on opening the Zagreb-Okucani railway, although implementation was firmly linked by the Serbs to renewal of the UNPROFOR mandate.

C. Political negotiations

11. Following President Tudjman's announcement on 12 January 1995, the "Zagreb-4" ambassadors, comprising the United States and Russian ambassadors to Croatia and Ambassadors Ahrens and Eide from the International Conference for the Former Yugoslavia, presented a "Draft agreement on the Krajina, Slavonia, Southern Baranja and Western Sirmium" to both sides on 30 January 1995. While the Croatian Government accepted the plan as a basis for negotiation, the Serbs in Knin refused to receive it until the future presence of UNPROFOR was assured. Subject to the renewal of UNPROFOR's mandate, the Serbs expressed their readiness to enter into political discussions from 1 April.

D. Humanitarian issues

12. Further to my report of 14 January 1995 (S/1995/38), UNPROFOR and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have continued to assist in facilitating the voluntary return of displaced people to their homes in those areas where return can take place in conditions of security and dignity, and in accordance with humanitarian principles. They have also acted as a catalyst to mobilize assistance from other organizations and coordinate their efforts in this regard. The security situation along the zone of separation has improved and stabilized under the cease-fire agreement to the extent that several thousand displaced persons have returned to their homes of their own volition. However, large-scale returns have not been possible in the absence of substantial progress towards a political settlement. It would, moreover, have been contrary to international humanitarian law and practice for the United Nations to encourage returns to areas that remained insecure as a result of high levels of hostility or widespread mine-infestation, and where the human rights of minorities could not be guaranteed.

13. During the period under review, UNPROFOR continued its humanitarian activities, including assisting UNHCR and other agencies in the transport and distribution of humanitarian aid, protecting minorities in the United Nations protected areas, and in seeking to develop humanitarian confidence-building measures. In Sector North, UNPROFOR's role was vital in helping UNHCR to assist 30,000 refugees from the Bihac pocket who fled into the sector in August and did not return to Velika Kladusa until the end of December 1994. Similarly, UNPROFOR committed substantial resources in support of UNHCR to protect and assist some 15,000 refugees expelled from the Banja Luka area during their transit through Sector West, pending their admission to refugee centres by the Croatian authorities.

14. A continuing grave problem was Serb obstruction of the passage through the United Nations protected areas of convoys for humanitarian relief and UNPROFOR resupply. Despite numerous promises from the Serb leadership, deliberate bureaucratic and armed obstruction of convoys placed the lives and welfare of United Nations personnel and aid recipients at risk.

E. The Prevlaka peninsula

15. The demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula, which was achieved under UNPROFOR supervision following the adoption of Security Council resolution 779 (1992) of 6 October 1992, significantly contributed to normalizing the security situation in this area although a certain number of incidents did occur. The area remains of considerable strategic importance to both Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Thus the construction, in recent months, of extensive Croatian defences within the "yellow" and "blue" zones, along with challenges to UNPROFOR's interpretation of the established security regime, has had a destabilizing influence. I should therefore like to reiterate the view reflected in my report of 17 September 1994 (S/1994/1067) that an UNPROFOR withdrawal before a final political settlement is reached would increase the risk of renewed hostilities in this area. The recent rise in tensions is of serious concern and I have requested my Special Representative, in cooperation with the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference, to renew his efforts to ensure full compliance by the parties with the security regime established in the Prevlaka peninsula.

IV. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

A. Military situation

16. In my report to the Council of 17 September 1994 (S/1994/1067), I noted that, while significant progress had been made in stabilizing the military situation in many parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, events in recent months had demonstrated the fragility of the peace on the ground. I pointed out that military restraint by the warring parties in some areas was undermined by aggressive acts in others, resulting in a marked variation in progress towards normalization of life in different parts of the country. I also stressed, however, that the continuation of warfare in parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina should not be allowed to obscure the largely successful peace-keeping work carried out by the Force. These observations are even more relevant today.

17. Immediately following the renewal of UNPROFOR's mandate, the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina could generally be described as unstable. There was fighting in most areas of the country, including around Sarajevo. Relations between the Bosnian Serbs and UNPROFOR were poor but, in spite of this, some progress was made on humanitarian issues. During the period from 1 October 1994 to 18 December 1994, the urban area of Sarajevo remained largely free from fighting. Shelling, sniping and military engagements were all at low levels and the heavy weapons exclusion zone was generally respected. Elsewhere in the Sarajevo area, however, there was more activity. Bosnian Government forces launched a series of attacks on Bosnian Serb-controlled territory in the area of Mount Igman and Mount Bjelasnica, gaining approximately 100 square kilometres of territory. To prosecute their offensive, Bosnian Army troops transited the "Igman demilitarized zone", which represented a clear violation of the agreement of 14 August 1993. UNPROFOR obtained numerous undertakings from the Bosnian authorities indicating that they would return to compliance with the agreement. Despite this, the Bosnian Army continued to use the zone for military purposes, and UNPROFOR's apparent failure to stop them was the cause of considerable

friction between UNPROFOR and the Bosnian Serb side. On 22 September 1994, following a Bosnian Serb Army attack on an UNPROFOR vehicle resulting in the serious wounding of one soldier, close air support was utilized. The Bosnian Serb Army threatened to retaliate against UNPROFOR and, on 25 September, flights into Sarajevo airport were suspended for several weeks in view of security threats against aircraft.

18. Despite the blockade of Sarajevo by Bosnian Serb forces, humanitarian supplies in the city never fell to critical levels as a large stockpile of basic commodities had been built up. Utilities were, however, at minimal levels and there was a long interruption in gas supplies to Sarajevo in November 1994. There was almost no freedom of movement for local civilians seeking to enter or leave the city. None the less, the Bosnian Government and Bosnian Serb leaders signed a significant agreement on the release of prisoners and other humanitarian issues at the beginning of October, following an intense negotiating effort involving leading political and military officials. The agreement called for the release of several hundred prisoners from jails in Konjic, Gorazde, Foca, Visegrad and elsewhere. In addition, the Bosnian Serbs agreed to allow UNHCR to move a total of nine convoys into Gorazde in the following seven-day period, and to allow a limited number of civilians to move in or out of the pocket. As a result of this agreement, the largest exchange of prisoners since the beginning of the war took place between the Bosnian Government and the Bosnian Serbs on 6 October 1994. Two hundred and ninety-five prisoners were released across the Bratstvo-Jedinstvo bridge in Sarajevo, 129 persons from the Government side and 166 from the Bosnian Serb side. At the same time, 40 medical cases were evacuated from Gorazde, 47 Bosnian Serbs left the enclave, and 7 special UNHCR food convoys entered it as part of the overall agreement. At the last minute, the parties themselves made an agreement under which 133 Muslim civilians were exchanged at the bridge for 11 Bosnian Serb civilians.

19. The overall situation deteriorated, however, and reached crisis point in late November, when the Bosnian Serbs entered the designated safe area of Bihac in repulsing an offensive launched in October from the Bihac pocket by the Bosnian Army. Following air attacks by Krajina Serbs into the Bihac pocket on 18 and 19 November 1994, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air strikes on the Udbina airfield in UNPA Sector South in Croatia and on Bosnian Serb missile sites on 21 and 23 November 1994 respectively, the situation sharply worsened. Severe restrictions were imposed on UNPROFOR movements within Sector Sarajevo, all Bosnian Serb checkpoints were closed, some 250 troops were confined within weapons collection points and 26 United Nations military observers were detained in their quarters. Elsewhere, convoys with 165 UNPROFOR soldiers destined for the "safe areas" were held at Bosnian Serb checkpoints at Zvornik, Rogatica and Usti Praca and 55 soldiers were detained in Ilijas. While there was no direct targeting of United Nations aircraft, Sarajevo airport had to be closed as a safety measure. The viability of UNPROFOR's mission was seriously threatened.

20. On 30 November 1994, I paid a visit to Sarajevo in order to express to both sides my strong concern regarding the need for a cease-fire and negotiations between the parties. Though I met with President Izetbegovic, my meeting with Mr. Karadzic did not take place as a result of differences on the venue of the

meeting. Immediately following my visit, a period of intense negotiations for a cease-fire and a cessation of hostilities was commenced by my Special Representative. The visit of former United States President Jimmy Carter to Sarajevo and Pale in mid-December greatly facilitated this process and led to the Bosnian Serbs announcing their willingness to agree to a cease-fire. Following President Carter's visit, my Special Representative was able to secure a cease-fire agreement between the sides on 23 December 1994 and a cessation-of-hostilities agreement on 31 December 1994 (S/1995/8). The latter agreement, which came into effect on 1 January 1995, included nine basic elements: a four-month cessation of hostilities; the establishment of a joint commission to oversee implementation of the agreement; an exchange of liaison officers; the separation of forces, withdrawal of heavy weapons and interpositioning of UNPROFOR troops along the line of confrontation; freedom of movement for UNPROFOR and UNHCR, particularly for the purpose of delivering aid and monitoring human rights; compliance with earlier agreements concerning Sarajevo and certain areas in eastern Bosnia; restoration of utilities and joint economic activities; release of prisoners and provision of information on missing persons; and cooperation with UNPROFOR in the monitoring and withdrawal of foreign troops. On 2 January 1995, Bosnian Croat leaders joined the agreements brokered by my Special Representative.

21. Implementation of the agreements concluded in the last week of 1994 has been the principal focus of UNPROFOR's activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the beginning of January. In the first month following the cease-fire and cessation-of-hostilities agreements, military activities of all the parties declined substantially throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, except in the area of Bihac. There was a marked improvement in the quality of life for the citizens of Sarajevo and significant gains in freedom of movement and in the humanitarian situation throughout the country. Significant progress was achieved on some of the provisions of paragraph 6 of the cessation-of-hostilities agreement, which reaffirmed earlier agreements concerning Sarajevo, Srebrenica and Gorazde. The parties agreed that UNPROFOR would open the roads around Sarajevo, closed since July 1994, when the Bosnian side evacuated the Mount Igman demilitarized zone. A series of follow-up agreements established a mechanism for verifying the withdrawal of Bosnian Government forces and determined the timetable and regime according to which the roads around Sarajevo would be opened, first for a limited number of "official international humanitarian organizations" and then for civilians and other humanitarian organizations. A joint reconnaissance of the Mount Igman demilitarized zone was undertaken which verified the Bosnian Government's evacuation of the area, although UNPROFOR continued to observe Bosnian Army troops transiting through the zone.

22. Progress on the Mount Igman issue made progress possible on the issue of the routes and, on 1 February 1995, the airport roads were opened for the first category of humanitarian organizations. No further agreement was possible, however, and on 5 February UNPROFOR informed the two sides that the airport roads would be opened the next day for civilian traffic only. Three days later, the bus route from Sarajevo to Visoko, via Serb-controlled territory, was opened on the same basis. During February, 116,000 people crossed the airport roads, with some 88,000 people travelling between the two Bosnian Government-controlled areas and 28,000 between the two Bosnian Serb-controlled areas. The route to Visoko was also used by civilians travelling in buses, though on a smaller

scale. This road was closed by the Bosnian Serbs three weeks later. Following the killing of two Serb girls in March by a Bosnian sniper, the airport roads were closed by the Bosnian Serbs and remain closed.

23. Despite the general success of the cease-fire agreement and some success on the provisions of the cessation-of-hostilities agreement, little progress was achieved in January on the provisions relating to the separation of forces, interpositioning of UNPROFOR troops and the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The vital mechanism of Joint Commissions failed to function as a result of the refusal of both sides to participate in Commission meetings. These developments, coupled with the refusal of the Bosnian Government to accept the placement of Bosnian Serb liaison officers at UNPROFOR Sector headquarters on Bosnian Government-controlled territory and continued military preparations by the parties, gave rise to concerns about the long-term viability of the cessation-of-hostilities agreement. It increasingly appeared that the parties' principal objective was a winter truce, during which the combatants would be able to rest, reorganize and train in preparation for a future offensive. A continued lack of cooperation on these issues in February 1995, in addition to persistent attacks and counter-attacks in the Bihac area, illustrated the fragility of the situation and gave further grounds for fearing renewed hostilities at or before the expiration of the four-month cessation-of-hostilities agreement.

24. The Bosnian Government has already made it clear to UNPROFOR that it is not interested in extending the agreement if the Bosnian Serbs are unwilling to accept the peace plan proposed by the Contact Group, at least as a starting point for negotiations. Government forces have begun to apply significant restrictions on UNPROFOR's freedom of movement in government-controlled territory, resulting in lack of access for UNPROFOR to certain areas of central Bosnia. The Bosnian Serb leadership, for its part, has also prepared itself for further hostilities. While Bosnian Serb controls on UNPROFOR eased considerably in the early stages of the cessation-of-hostilities, a marked deterioration in UNPROFOR's freedom of movement in Bosnian Serb-controlled areas has become apparent in recent weeks. The Bosnian Serb side has imposed tight controls on supplies to the enclaves, particularly on fuel and medical supplies, and has indicated that it will renew hostilities unless the Bosnian Government immediately complies with the provisions of the cessation-of-hostilities agreement. As a result of the current impasse, the security situation in Sarajevo has begun to deteriorate, with increasing sniping at civilians and targeting of UNPROFOR and UNHCR aircraft.

25. Fighting and blockage of delivery of supplies continue in the Bihac pocket in north-western Bosnia. UNPROFOR's repeated efforts to achieve a cease-fire in the Bihac region have failed and military activities continue, particularly to the north of the pocket, where forces loyal to Mr. Fikret Abdic battle the Bosnian Government's forces. On 12 December 1994, the Krajina Serbs or their allies, the forces of Mr. Abdic, specifically targeted a Bangladeshi armoured personnel carrier, killing one soldier and seriously wounding five others. The role of the Krajina Serbs, in the present situation and throughout the Bihac crisis, requires special mention. They have launched artillery and ground attacks across the international border and have provided active support from the United Nations protected areas for the Abdic-led forces in the Bihac pocket.

In addition, since June 1994, Krajina Serbs have continued their policy of obstructing humanitarian aid and supplies to the Bangladeshi battalion. UNHCR has managed to deliver only 15 per cent of its target to the Bihac pocket during the reporting period. This has led to a mounting crisis in the Bosnian Government-controlled portion of the pocket where there is fear of imminent widespread malnutrition. The Krajina Serbs continue to frustrate both UNPROFOR and UNHCR by their insistence that convoys should pass only through territory controlled by Mr. Abdic, and by subjecting convoy personnel to erratic and obstructive "checking", as well as to the dangers of either deliberate targeting or being caught in cross-fire. Repeated attempts of my Special Representative, in coordination with UNHCR, to gain regular access to the Bihac pocket, without traversing Velika Kladusa, have not met with success.

26. The complexity of the situation in the Bihac pocket, where five more or less distinct parties can be identified, poses a daunting challenge for UNPROFOR. In the south, near Bihac town, the situation is at an impasse. The Bosnian Serbs insist that the Bosnian Government forces return to the positions they occupied at the signing of the cessation-of-hostilities agreement. The Bosnian Government, having retaken control of the safe area and its water supply, has refused this demand and insisted that the Krajina Serb forces withdraw from the Bihac pocket, as foreseen under paragraph 9 of the cessation-of-hostilities agreement. In the north, near Velika Kladusa, the fighting continues with no solution in sight and the Krajina Serbs remain actively involved. The resultant instability makes it unlikely that UNHCR will achieve the access necessary to keep the population in the south of the pocket properly nourished and the prospect of an UNPROFOR withdrawal from the protected areas in Croatia makes the aid and resupply situation even more tenuous. Should the situation fester, Bihac could again become a flash-point for wider conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

27. In this connection, I should like once again to draw the attention of the Security Council to my reports on the safe areas in documents S/1994/555 of 9 May and S/1994/1389 of 1 December 1994, upon which the Council has not yet acted.

B. Action plan for Sarajevo

28. The work of the Office of the Special Coordinator for Sarajevo has, during the reporting period, been directly affected by the changing situation in and around Sarajevo. Conditions deteriorated considerably during the last quarter of 1994 as restrictions on access were tightened and shelling and sniping increased. By December, conditions in Sarajevo were such that some people questioned whether implementation of any sizable portion of the action plan was likely in the foreseeable future. This rather bleak picture changed appreciably for the better following the cessation-of-hostilities agreement. As a result of the opening of the Sarajevo airport roads in February 1995, commodities, including those required for the implementation of the action plan, could be brought into the city. In fact, trucks carrying materials for the action plan projects were among the first to cross the airport roads under the new agreement. In addition, project formulation and financing are gathering speed. At present, about 20 Trust Fund projects are either under implementation or

awaiting approval, including projects for the repair of roads, improvement of water quality, a gas safety campaign and the purchase of garbage trucks. Another action plan project at an early stage of preparation concerns the restoration of the Sarajevo-Ploce railway line.

29. While a great deal of work remains to be done, the prospects for the Office of the Special Coordinator to make substantial progress in restoring essential services to Sarajevo appeared until recent days to be brighter than they had been for some considerable time. However, they remained dependent upon the continuance of relative peace in and around Sarajevo and upon access to the city remaining as it was or, better still, improving. In the event of a resumption of hostilities and lasting closure of the airport routes, efforts at restoring essential services to the city would inevitably be severely compromised.

C. The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

30. In contrast to the difficulties in achieving full implementation of the cessation-of-hostilities agreement in some areas, substantial progress has been achieved in improving relations between the Bosniac and Bosnian Croat parties in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Now one year old, the Federation demonstrates that, with the assistance of the international community, former adversaries can stop fighting and cooperate on questions of mutual political, economic and humanitarian benefit. Throughout the contiguous territory of the Federation, UNPROFOR has played a major role in supporting the peace process. UNPROFOR battalions have monitored the cease-fire of February 1994 and the buffer zone between the parties, overseen the separation of forces and controlled heavy weapons through the establishment of weapons collections points and active sites. In Mostar, through agreement reached with the European Union Administration of that city, UNPROFOR has monitored the process of demilitarization and provided a secure environment for the Administration to operate. UNPROFOR battalions have also provided human resources for the restoration of infrastructure. Roads and bridges have been rebuilt by UNPROFOR; water, sewage, and telephone systems have been repaired with UNPROFOR's assistance. The results are impressive. Power lines have been restored to over 90 per cent of the villages in the Federation territory. Electricity production has increased by at least 50 per cent. Thousands of people have been able to move freely through UNPROFOR-controlled checkpoints. However, problems persist in relations between the two communities, particularly in respect of freedom of movement between territories controlled by each party, and tensions have arisen that continue to require the vigilant efforts of the international community.

31. The Joint Commission Policy Committee (JCPC), established under the auspices of UNPROFOR, has brought the Federation parties together to address a wide range of political, military, social and economic issues. JCPC has proved to be an effective joint structure that has taken the lead in identifying and resolving problems and ensuring communications between the two communities. It is only through the process of fostering Bosniac-Croat relations at all levels that the further goals of the Federation can be achieved. It is hoped that the parties will avail themselves of the services of UNCIVPOL in the creation of joint municipal, cantonal and federal police forces. Unfortunately, the work of

JCPC is now stalled over the Bosnian Government's insistence on the departure of the Bosnian Serb liaison officer from the town of Gornji Vakuf.

32. This suspension of the JCPC process is symptomatic of the wider failure of the parties to cooperate on fundamental issues such as the return of displaced persons to their homes and the formation and functioning of Federation institutions. Despite the vigorous efforts of the European Union in Mostar, further steps towards reconciliation have been resisted by one of the parties, though it is hoped that recent high-level agreements may finally break the impasse. Nevertheless, the danger remains that the unresolved issues may unravel the progress achieved so far, and that frustration may lead to friction between the communities, with serious consequences for the future of the Federation. I have therefore instructed UNPROFOR to continue to work at all levels to help to consolidate the Federation.

D. Humanitarian and human rights issues

33. During the period November-December 1994, UNHCR found humanitarian access very difficult and problematic. However, after the conclusion of the comprehensive cease-fire agreement and the agreement on the cessation-of-hostilities in December, UNHCR has enjoyed adequate access to the enclaves and Sarajevo in respect of delivery of food, fuel and winterization materials, although the delivery of medical supplies was frequently obstructed. In Bihac, however, UNHCR failed to obtain regular access. Furthermore, there was a deterioration in the situation in Sarajevo leading to the suspension of the airlift in the latter part of March, with a corresponding decline in humanitarian resupply of the city.

34. As described in my last report to the Council, serious violations of human rights have persisted in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly in Bosnian Serb-controlled territory. Recently, UNHCR has reported on a new wave of attacks against minorities in the Banja Luka area, in which Muslim houses have been systematically robbed and their occupants terrorized. In pursuance of relevant Security Council resolutions and presidential statements, and in line with the implementation of the human rights aspects of the cessation-of-hostilities agreement, UNPROFOR has repeatedly sought, without success, the deployment of civil affairs and civilian police monitors into areas controlled by the Bosnian Serbs. During a visit of the UNPROFOR Head of Civil Affairs to Banja Luka with a team of civil affairs officers on 21 and 22 January 1995, the question of the protection of minorities was raised with the Banja Luka authorities. Despite assurances received from the Bosnian Serbs that civil affairs officers could continue making visits to Banja Luka and the Doboj regions, the Bosnian Serbs, on 25 February, demanded the removal of UNPROFOR's recently installed civil affairs presence in Banja Luka. (UNPROFOR has since received assurances that future visits will be allowed, on certain conditions.) Around the same time, the UNPROFOR Civilian Police Commissioner was informed of the Bosnian Serbs' objection to the deployment of civilian police monitors on their territory. Some progress has, however, been made with an agreement for the establishment of a Civil Affairs Office in the Serb-controlled area of Grbavica in Sarajevo.

35. A significant step forward in the promotion of human rights in the territory of the Federation has been made with the establishment of three ombudsmen in Sarajevo, under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Following a request by OSCE, UNPROFOR civilian and civil police monitors will facilitate the work of the ombudsmen. In addition, a comprehensive plan for the deployment of UNPROFOR civilian police monitors in Federation territory, supported by the Bosnian Government, is under discussion with local authorities. The plan envisages the deployment of an additional 60 civilian police assigned to the Federation, mainly to deal with the treatment of minorities.

E. Cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

36. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has continued to support the United Nations with substantial maritime and aerial operations. The joint NATO/Western European Union operation "Sharp Guard" enforces the Adriatic embargo in accordance with Council resolution 820 (1993) while operation "Deny Flight" continues to provide aerial monitoring and enforcement of the "no-fly-zone", as well as protective close air support, air strikes and the enhancement of the security of the United Nations-designated safe areas within Bosnia and Herzegovina when requested by UNPROFOR. The "no-fly-zone" enforcement has successfully prevented the use by the warring sides of offensive air power, and the availability of NATO air power has considerably strengthened UNPROFOR's bargaining position in negotiating convoy clearances. In the event of increased hostilities or the withdrawal of UNPROFOR, the deterrent value and possible employment of air power will be vital to the security of UNPROFOR personnel.

37. At my request, NATO has devoted considerable resources to contingency planning and other preparations to support a possible UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia and Herzegovina and/or Croatia. This activity has been performed in close coordination, and in an excellent spirit of cooperation, with UNPROFOR.

38. I would like to emphasize that, despite regular and frequent infringements of the "no-fly-zone" by helicopters and some occasional fixed-wing activity, I remain convinced that the deterrent effect of NATO operations has contributed to the effective containment of warring faction air activity for combat purposes. I place a high value on the security that UNPROFOR derives from NATO's operations and contingency measures, and welcome the continued excellent cooperation between UNPROFOR and NATO at all levels.

V. FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

39. The internal political situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia over the last six months has been dominated by three events - the holding of parliamentary and presidential elections in October 1994; the announcement of the 1994 census results; and heightened tensions between the Government and elements in the ethnic Albanian population, as well as between the Government and nationalist elements in the ethnic Macedonian majority.

40. Within the good offices function of my Special Representative provided for in paragraph 12 of Council resolution 908 (1994), the delegate of my Special Representative, upon the invitation of the President of the Parliament of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, joined the then Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe and other international organizations in monitoring the parliamentary and presidential elections held in October 1994. While certain irregularities were noted in the elections, the overall opinion of the observers was that the elections had been conducted in a generally orderly, regular and peaceful manner. However, the two major opposition parties within the country, VRMO-DPMNE and the Democratic Party, considered the first round of the elections to have been fraudulent. As a result, they boycotted the second round, leading to the parties already in power securing an overwhelming majority of 95 of the 120 seats in Parliament. The parties that boycotted the elections hold influence over a significant portion of the electorate; as they now recognize neither the Parliament nor the President, a situation exists that is not conducive to constructive political dialogue.

41. As reported to the Council on 17 September 1994 (S/1994/1067), the Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia conducted a nationwide census from 25 June to 11 July 1994 in order to establish accurate estimates of the ethnic composition of the population. This exercise was monitored, financed and partly organized by the Council of Europe and the European Union. In November 1994, the Government announced the results, which showed that 67 per cent of the resident population in the Republic were ethnic Macedonians, 23 per cent were ethnic Albanians, and the remaining 10 per cent were formed of Turks, Serbs, Vlachs, Gypsies and people of non-identified ethnicity. Despite verification by international observers of the veracity of the results and the proper conduct of the census, ethnic Albanian leaders have disputed the results.

42. Recently, some leaders of the ethnic Albanian population have stepped up demands for improvements in their political, economic, social, cultural and educational status, including recognition of Albanian as the Republic's second official language. There has been a confrontation between some ethnic Albanians and the Government over action by the former to establish an Albanian-language university in Tetovo. The ethnic Albanian leaders involved in this effort have argued that the State's two existing universities in Skopje and Bitola, whose instruction is in the Macedonian language, as well as the Pedagogical Academy in Skopje, which recently restored some instruction in the Albanian language, are not sufficient, and that an Albanian-language university is therefore required. The Government takes the view that the project to establish such a university outside the State system is against the Constitution and the laws of the Republic, and has charged that the supporters of the project are using a purportedly educational issue to advance their political ambitions of "federalization", aimed eventually at creating a greater Albania. Police have intervened on several occasions to halt the project, culminating in an incident on 17 February in which, during a demonstration in Tetovo in support of the project, one ethnic Albanian was shot dead, and a number of policemen injured. The Ministry of Internal Affairs has filed criminal charges against five supporters of the project. Shortly after this incident, ethnic Albanian members of Parliament, who hold 19 of the 120 seats in Parliament, boycotted

parliamentary sessions in support of their demands for use of Albanian as the second official language.

43. Internal political, social and inter-ethnic difficulties continue to be exacerbated by the fragile state of the country's economy. Approximately 30 per cent of the workforce is unemployed; the inflation rate for 1994 exceeded 50 per cent. The trade embargo imposed by Greece in February 1994, as well as United Nations sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), continue to disrupt severely the country's principal export/import routes on its southern and northern borders. In addition, international investors have shown reluctance to invest in the country. The Government is, however, making great efforts to transform the economy to a free-market system, and is receiving some assistance from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the European Union and individual Member States. The economy is showing signs of strength in some areas, but still faces great challenges and needs further international support.

44. UNPROFOR's mission to monitor and report along the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's borders with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Albania reveals no current military threat. Since my last report, however, there has been no decisive move towards establishing a clear international border between the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Following incidents in the area of the disputed border between the two countries in the summer of 1994, UNPROFOR negotiated a military administrative boundary between the two parties that determines the northern limit of the area of operation for UNPROFOR troops. Although neither Government acknowledges the military administrative boundary as a legitimate international border, both sides use it for the reporting and management of border-crossing incidents. While UNPROFOR has monitored military patrols from both countries crossing the boundary, it has observed no tension between the sides. However, the potential for confrontation still exists in the absence of a mutually recognized international border and it remains of primary importance that a joint border commission begin work to resolve this long-outstanding issue.

VI. OTHER MATTERS

A. Human rights

45. UNPROFOR's widespread presence throughout the mission area, the close liaison with local authorities effected by its civil affairs component and the mandate conferred upon CIVPOL by the Security Council have encouraged UNPROFOR to intensify its efforts to enhance respect for the human rights of minority populations in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Following discussions with UNHCR, the Centre for Human Rights and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), UNPROFOR took the initiative to form an Inter-Agency Working Group on Human Rights Issues under the chairmanship of the Head of Civil Affairs on 13 January 1995. The Working Group, which meets on an as-needed basis, has capitalized on the various bodies' common interest in improving respect for human rights throughout the mission area, to share resources, reduce duplication and coordinate ongoing efforts to

promote pluralism in the communities in which the Force is deployed. Representatives from OSCE and the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) are also invited to participate when issues germane to their activities are addressed.

46. With due consideration for the constraints imposed by the scope of each agency's mandate and the need to guarantee respect for confidentiality, the Working Group has sought to maximize the efficiency and efficacy of human rights monitoring by encouraging information-sharing. In agreement with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr. Jose Ayala Lasso, the Working Group has also launched a series of training sessions to enable field officers deployed throughout the mission area to understand their role and the resources available to them in protecting human rights. In this connection, the Working Group has developed an information package containing the primary international documents on human rights for dissemination to field officers and expects to form a cadre of human rights trainers in the near term. The Working Group has also encouraged field staff to support local NGOs and civic groups in their defence of human rights.

B. Public information

47. Since its establishment in February 1994, UNPROFOR's Division of Information has developed and implemented a far-reaching press and public information programme for the populations in the mission area. Publications, print products and radio and television programmes to inform the public about UNPROFOR's mission, mandate and activities are produced in local languages on a continual basis and are widely disseminated throughout the mission area. Press and public information offices have been established in Sarajevo, the four United Nations protected areas, Skopje, Belgrade and most recently in Sectors South-West and North-East in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

48. Pursuant to paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 947 (1994) of 30 September 1994, by which the Council endorsed the Secretary-General's report of 17 September 1994, UNPROFOR has been actively working to establish a radio station that would broadcast local-language programmes about United Nations activities throughout its mission area. After a series of contacts with the Croatian broadcasting authorities, UNPROFOR was informed in February 1995 that it would be allocated three FM frequencies for radio broadcasts restricted to the protected areas. UNPROFOR is currently discussing with the Croatian Government the possibility of obtaining frequencies that would reach all of Croatia, but the Croatian authorities have so far been unwilling to authorize them. They have also insisted on the payment of substantial fees for the allocation of frequencies in the protected areas.

49. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, fruitful discussions have been held with the relevant government bodies with regard to the establishment of an UNPROFOR broadcast radio facility. In meetings earlier this year, the Ministry of Transport and Communications requested that UNPROFOR first clarify a number of outstanding issues with regard to communications frequencies, prior to the allocation of FM radio frequencies for its use. Significant steps have been taken by UNPROFOR to comply with this request, and it is expected that the

allocation of FM frequencies for UNPROFOR radio broadcasts and permission to establish transmitter sites will be granted in the very near future. It should be noted that the Bosnian Serb authorities have consistently refused to allow UNPROFOR to broadcast its radio or television programmes in territories under their control.

50. UNPROFOR television programmes in local languages are broadcast regularly twice per week on national television stations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. More than 100 programmes about United Nations work in the former Yugoslavia and current events have been produced. Programmes are also occasionally broadcast on Croatian television, although the Croatian television authorities have been unwilling to grant UNPROFOR regular broadcast slots.

51. The Security Council may wish to consider calling upon all Governments and authorities in the UNPROFOR mission area to co-operate with the United Nations in the provision of suitable radio broadcasting frequencies and television broadcast slots, at no cost to the Organization, in order to help it to fulfil the responsibilities entrusted to it by the Council.

C. Mine-related activities

52. While mine-awareness training has continued to be implemented throughout the Force, UNPROFOR has continued to suffer mine-related casualties, with 25 personnel injured in 16 incidents over the period from October 1994 to March 1995. In Croatia, local reluctance to support mine-clearance in the protected areas has generally increased and a significant amount of new mining within the zone of separation has occurred on both sides. Such activities have been protested when discovered and the mines cleared where possible. Since 8 February 1995, the Krajina Serbs have refused to cooperate in any mine-clearance activity. Without the participation of both sides, mine-clearance in Croatia has virtually ceased.

53. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, mine-clearance in support of United Nations operations has continued on a sporadic basis. Of note, however, is Sector South-West, which has continued to pursue mine-clearance actively in support of infrastructure restoration projects in the Vitez pocket and Mostar.

54. At present, a number of initiatives are being taken to improve mine capabilities within the Force, in accordance with my report of 17 September and as endorsed by the Council in resolution 947 (1994). These include the setting up of a new mine-information system, the use of mine-sensing dogs, an increase in mine-roller systems, and a mine-coordination centre for control and coordination of all mine-related activities throughout the mission.

D. Status-of-forces agreements

55. In paragraph 25 of my report of 14 January 1995 (S/1995/38), I drew attention to the lack of progress in concluding a status-of-forces agreement

between UNPROFOR and the Republic of Croatia. This situation continues. I wish to draw attention in particular to the difficulties and expense caused to UNPROFOR by the fact that it has not been provided with adequate premises and facilities, free of cost, as envisaged in the model status-of-forces agreement (see A/45/594). UNPROFOR has had to rent premises at substantial cost and even to pay taxes on the purchase of fuel, tolls for the use of highways, etc., in all cases under protest and with intimation to the authorities that claims will be lodged. The position taken by the Government of Croatia directly contravenes Security Council resolution 908 (1994), paragraph 7. The establishment of UNPROFOR's headquarters and principal logistic bases in Croatia without the prior conclusion of a status-of-forces agreement has increasingly added to the difficulties and overall costs of the mission. While the Croatian authorities were most cooperative and generous during the initial phase of the mission, there have been recent indications that UNPROFOR's continuing use of Croatian facilities is being approached on a commercial basis. This may have contributed to the imposition on UNPROFOR of a fuel tax of $8.6 million from July to December 1994 and airport charges of $2.5 million from January to December 1994, all of which are inconsistent with the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, to which the Government of Croatia is a party.

56. The status-of-forces agreement with the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (15 May 1993) regulates UNPROFOR's presence in that country, although it cannot be said that UNPROFOR has been provided free of cost with the various premises it requires, as called for by the agreement. The Government has recently demanded that UNPROFOR surrender certain facilities it occupies and pay rent on others. Such demands are inconsistent with the status-of-forces agreement. Moreover, the Bosnian Government has indicated its desire to reopen negotiations on certain aspects of that agreement, particularly those relating to the terms and conditions for locally employed staff members. UNPROFOR has expressed its concern to the Government over the increasing incidents of taxation of local staff members, the forcible mobilization of employees of draft age, and the detention of those staff members who fail to comply with mobilization orders.

57. By an exchange of letters dated 13 March 1995 between my Special Representative, and the Minister for Foreign Relations of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Mr. Stevo Crvenkovski, an agreement was reached between the United Nations and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on the status of UNPROFOR and its personnel in that host country.

58. There has also been no progress so far on the conclusion of the necessary arrangements with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The Security Council may wish to reiterate its call on the Governments concerned to conclude such agreements without delay. This is particularly important in respect of the Government of Croatia, whose economy profits considerably from the presence of the United Nations on its territory.

VII. OBSERVATIONS

59. In my interim report to the Council of 14 January 1995 (S/1995/38) I noted that, despite the earlier inability of UNPROFOR to fulfil important parts of its mandate under the United Nations peace-keeping plan in Croatia, the successful

implementation of the cease-fire agreement of 29 March 1994 and the conclusion of the economic agreement on 2 December 1994 had been positive steps towards confidence-building and reconciliation. I expressed disappointment that the potential for success through the three-step approach - cessation of hostilities, economic normalization and political negotiations - had not been fully explored before the Croatian Government's decision on 12 January 1995 to withdraw its support for UNPROFOR's continuing role.

60. Over the past two months, the escalation of military activity and tension, the suspension of further cooperation in the implementation of the economic agreement and the continued failure of the parties to commence serious political negotiations have brought them to the brink of a major war. I therefore welcome the fact that President Tudjman, through his announcement on 12 March 1995 (S/1995/206), has recognized the grave dangers that would result from the premature departure of the United Nations peace-keeping force from Croatia and has agreed to its retention for the time being. While there are many factors that have precipitated the present crisis, the principal underlying cause has been the lingering lack of trust and confidence between the parties and the resultant political stalemate for the past three years, leading to fears on the Croatian side that a peaceful political settlement is unattainable and providing encouragement to hardliners on the Krajina Serb side to think that independence or union in a "Greater Serbia" are realistic options.

61. It should be recalled that the first principle of the original United Nations peace-keeping plan of 11 December 1991 (S/23280, annex III), to which all the parties had agreed, was that the arrangements for a United Nations peace-keeping operation would be of an interim nature, pending the negotiation of an overall settlement. As noted in my report of 15 February 1992 (S/23592), these arrangements "... will be without prejudice to that settlement or to the principle that the internal boundaries of Yugoslavia cannot be changed by force or without the consent of the parties concerned."

62. Over the past three years, UNPROFOR's activities in Croatia have succeeded to a large extent in establishing the cessation of hostilities that was essential for political dialogue to begin. The implementation of the economic agreement has, in a short time, demonstrated that the two communities can interact with each other in peaceful endeavours and with mutual benefits. The best efforts of UNPROFOR have not, however, produced political movement in a time-frame that is acceptable to the Government of Croatia and to the thousands of displaced Croats who wish to return to their homes in the United Nations protected areas. On the Krajina Serb side, apprehension and mistrust of the Government, together with internal political turmoil, have continued to inhibit participation in a political process that would lead to the integration of the protected areas into the Croatian State. It is significant that there appears to be very little pressure from the estimated 200,000 displaced Serbs to return to their homes in government-administered territory.

63. Many misperceptions have arisen about UNPROFOR's fundamental tasks in Croatia. As the Council considers the question of maintaining a United Nations peace-keeping presence there, it is timely for me to restate the basic principles of such a presence. A United Nations peace-keeping force can operate effectively only with the consent and full cooperation of the parties. It is an

interim measure whose purpose is to help the parties to find a durable peace based on agreement between the parties themselves. It is not intended nor equipped to impose a solution on the parties. In the specific case of Croatia, it is without prejudice to an eventual political settlement. Thus the zone of separation is a temporary measure to halt the fighting, create conditions for political negotiations and begin the process of restoring normal life.

64. It is my considered view that the three-phase process of negotiations is the only practical path to durable peace. The initial gains of the economic agreement, while affected by the limited resources available, have been significant, but they cannot be a substitute for political negotiations. In advancing towards a political settlement, the negotiations must be underpinned by consistent and conscientious policies, led by the Government of Croatia, of national reconciliation and trust-building between the two parties. These policies should include a comprehensive amnesty, freedom of travel, free access to the media and encouragement of human contacts at the grass-roots level. Improvement in the observance of human rights, including full international monitoring, is an essential step towards restoration of confidence and durable peace, while inflammatory and provocative rhetoric from either side endangers the peace process. All parties should refrain from such rhetoric and allow the establishment and unhampered functioning of objective and independent media. It should also be clearly accepted by the parties that all displaced persons have the right to return to their homes in conditions of safety, security and dignity.

65. In considering the United Nations future peace-keeping role in Croatia, I remain conscious of the likelihood of a renewal and widening of hostilities should UNPROFOR depart precipitously. I am also conscious of the potential for positive results from the implementation of the economic agreement and from the agreement of the Krajina Serb leadership to commence serious political negotiations as soon as the future presence of a United Nations peace-keeping force is assured.

66. Before President Tudjman's announcement of his agreement to the retention of a United Nations peace-keeping force, I had been examining the full range of options available. These included the retention of UNPROFOR in its present form and with its present mandate, with the consent of the Croatian Government; deployment, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, of a much larger force to perform the same tasks; a substantial reduction of the peace-keeping force with a new mandate; and the withdrawal of all United Nations peace-keeping forces from Croatia.

67. The retention of UNPROFOR in its present form and with its present mandate would not enjoy the consent of the Government of Croatia. As recent experience has shown, peace-keeping without credible assurances of cooperation from all the parties concerned is undesirable and impracticable; it is unlikely to lead to success. It was equally clear that the Chapter VII option was not feasible either politically or in resource terms.

68. At the same time, the total withdrawal of all United Nations peace-keeping forces from Croatia would result immediately in a grave threat to peace and security extending beyond the borders of Croatia. The probability of major

renewed conflict was high and participation of Bosnian Serb forces and support from forces belonging to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) could not be ruled out. Nor was it clear whether the peace-keeping operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina could be continued without a substantial United Nations presence and support facilities in Croatia.

69. The maintenance of a reduced force in Croatia under a new mandate thus seemed the only way to reduce the risks of a renewed major war, while permitting continued progress in implementing the economic agreement and beginning political negotiations. I thus welcomed the joint announcement on 12 March 1995 by the President of Croatia and the Vice-President of the United States, which opened the way to a solution along these lines.

70. As soon as the United States authorities provided the necessary information about their negotiations with the Croatian Government, I instructed Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg, acting as my Special Envoy, to conduct negotiations with the parties in order to define the mandate of a future United Nations peace-keeping force in Croatia that I could recommend to the Security Council in the knowledge that both parties would commit themselves to cooperate with that force in the implementation of its mandate.

71. It has become apparent from Mr. Stoltenberg's negotiations, with the support of UNPROFOR's civilian and military leadership, that an understanding on the details of the new mandate and the modalities of the United Nations peace-keeping operation requires further work. The gulf between the positions of the Government of Croatia and the Krajina Serb authorities on the role and functions of the new force remains wide, and I am not yet in a position to inform the Council that the parties would accord it their practical cooperation. Further negotiations are therefore necessary.

72. I am, however, able to report that, in my view, the basis could be established for agreement that the mandate of the force should include the following functions:

(a) Support for implementation of the cease-fire agreement of 29 March 1994;

(b) Support for implementation of the economic agreement of 2 December 1994;

(c) Implementation of those elements of the existing United Nations peace-keeping plan for Croatia that are accepted by both parties as having continuing relevance. These would include, but not be limited to, maintenance of a United Nations presence on the international borders of the Republic of Croatia and confidence-building and humanitarian tasks, such as assistance to refugees and displaced persons, protection of ethnic minorities, mine-clearance and convoy assistance.

In addition to this "core mandate", the new force would continue to perform functions arising from the accord on the Prevlaka peninsula and from relevant resolutions of the Security Council, such as those dealing with the monitoring of the "no-fly zone" and the extension of close air support in Croatia.

73. In advising the Security Council that I believe that agreement can be reached on a mandate comprising the above elements, I must stress that crucial differences remain between the Government of Croatia and the Krajina Serb authorities with regard to the nature, size and functions of the force in the zone of separation and in the United Nations protected areas. In particular, the deployment patterns (e.g., fixed posts or mobile patrols or a combination of the two) and mode of functioning (e.g., monitor and report, as opposed to stop and search) of the United Nations force in the zone of separation and on the international borders require further discussion. In this connection, it is pertinent to recall that UNPROFOR is already deployed in a monitoring function in the border areas, where it currently maintains 37 observation posts and 9 crossing-points with the cooperation of the local Krajina Serb authorities. Depending on the tasks finally agreed upon in the new mandate, a reduction from present troop levels would be possible, but it should be recognized that the capacity of the Force to react to developments would be commensurately lessened.

74. With regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNPROFOR's performance has been characterized by a mixture of achievements and setbacks. UNPROFOR has been successful in carrying out its mission in those areas where the parties have been willing to demonstrate good faith in implementing agreements and where the international community has provided a clear political context within which the mission can operate. A good example of the benefits of peace-keeping can be seen in UNPROFOR's achievements in the Federation, where considerable human resources have been devoted to building peace and enhancing tolerance and reconciliation between the parties through a variety of concrete measures designed to create conditions of normality for the general population. The facilitation of mutually beneficial joint economic projects to improve living conditions in central and southern Bosnia and Herzegovina has helped to lay a foundation of confidence and trust among a population that had previously witnessed some of the most intense fighting in the present conflict.

75. However, the failure of the Federation parties to address, in a practical manner, the fundamental issues of the return of displaced persons and of the Federation's institutional structures has limited UNPROFOR's ability to capitalize on the success achieved so far. The agreement signed in Bonn on 10 March 1995, calling for, among other things, the allocation of powers to federal bodies to the full extent stipulated in the Federation's Constitution, and a plan for the return of refugees and displaced persons, is a welcome development. UNPROFOR, with the assistance of the international community, stands ready to assist further in the development of joint economic development projects, expanded to include members of all ethnic communities in Federation territories.

76. Except in the area of Bihac, the cease-fire agreement of 23 December 1994 had, until recent days, been generally respected and has yielded tangible benefits for the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Unfortunately, some provisions of the cessation-of-hostilities agreement, aimed at consolidating the cease-fire and the situation on the ground, have not, for the most part, been implemented. The areas of difficulty include persistent ethnic cleansing in the Banja Luka region; the continued security and humanitarian crisis in Bihac; increased firing at civilians and aircraft in Sarajevo; the denial of freedom of movement for UNPROFOR, UNHCR and other international organizations; the

continued non-cooperation of the Bosnian Government with respect to the joint commissions; localized offensives and preparations for war by all parties; the continued closure of the Sarajevo airport roads; and the lack of progress on prisoner-of-war (POW) exchanges.

77. The continued lack of trust between the parties and their unwillingness to break out of a vicious circle of linkages has made it difficult to achieve further progress in implementation of the cessation-of-hostilities agreement. In the absence of a real will by the parties to cooperate, UNPROFOR is unable to resolve outstanding issues among them. As a result, more than ever before, they are faced with the probability of renewed hostilities in the near future. The escalation of sniping and shelling incidents in Sarajevo, the increased obstruction of humanitarian assistance by the Bosnian Serbs, particularly of medical and fuel supplies to the enclaves, increasing restrictions of movement and the recent government offensives in the Travnik and Tuzla areas are some of the signs of a steady deterioration in the overall situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. UNPROFOR's inability to deter attacks on the designated safe area of Bihac brought to the fore some of the key issues addressed in my previous reports to the Council on the concept of safe areas. Until the Council is able to provide clear guidance on these matters, it is unlikely that the commitment of the parties or, therefore, UNPROFOR's performance in respect of the safe areas will improve and the danger will remain that situations such as that in Bihac will recur.

78. UNPROFOR has consistently emphasized that implementation of the cessation-of-hostilities agreement, and its extension, will largely depend on progress on the political front. Although UNPROFOR has done its part in stabilizing the situation on the ground, thereby providing the necessary space for political negotiations, the lack of political progress at the higher level has undermined the achievements gained so far. The current impasse on the Contact Group's proposal has created a vacuum in which the Force has little or no political context for the pursuit of local initiatives and in which the parties have little or no incentive to cooperate. While the Force continues with dedication to perform humanitarian and confidence-building tasks, the lack of progress on the fundamental political questions has created a situation in which it can do little but to delay rather than prevent a renewed outbreak of hostilities. This could have negative consequences for the future of the Federation, which cannot remain immune from the processes in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina or the mission area as a whole. There is, therefore, an overwhelming need for political progress to be achieved if further fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina is to be avoided. I appeal to the members of the Contact Group to renew their efforts to fill the current vacuum.

79. During the past six months, relations between UNPROFOR and NATO have continued to be excellent. Close cooperation between the two organizations has continued despite the delicate balance required as a result of the different mandates and objectives of the two organizations. Under these conditions and in order to ensure continued fruitful cooperation, it remains essential that there be understanding of, and respect for, both the basic principle that NATO acts "in support of UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate" (to quote the language of Security Council resolution 836 (1993), para. 10) and the modalities for arbitrating possible differences in approach between the two organizations.

In an exchange of correspondence with the Secretary-General of NATO, Mr. Willy Claes, I have made it clear that, in the event that developments on the ground oblige me to undertake the withdrawal of United Nations personnel from any part of the theatre, it would be of great value to the United Nations to be able to call on the services of NATO, with the approval of the Security Council, to protect and if necessary conduct a withdrawal operation.

80. The situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is marked by a complex network of external and internal factors that contribute to economic and political uncertainty and rising social tension. UNPROFOR, acting within the good offices mandate given to my Special Representative by resolution 908 (1994) and in full cooperation with the authorities of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as well as with other external organizations such as OSCE and the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, has made a modest but important contribution to helping the authorities and various ethnic groups to maintain peace and stability and build a workable future. It is encouraging to note, in this first preventive peace-keeping mission, that both the Government and ethnic Albanian leaders have expressed appreciation to UNPROFOR for what they have termed its clear, objective, appropriate and helpful actions.

81. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia continues, however, to labour under the combined constraints of the economic blockade imposed by Greece and the effects of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the non-recognition of its borders by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and inter- and intra-ethnic tensions, all of which continue to undermine its stability and pose a threat to its fragile democracy. In addition to the persistent efforts of my Special Envoy, Mr. Cyrus Vance, the Council has given specific political and military mandates to my Special Representative and UNPROFOR to contribute to the maintenance of the peace and stability in this Republic. The Council may also wish to call, in the context of Article 50 of the Charter, for increased international economic support, which would play a key role in contributing to future peace and stability there. If threats to the Republic's peace and stability, either external or internal, were to increase significantly and to such an extent that a new mandate and reinforcements were judged necessary, I would submit the appropriate recommendations to the Security Council.

82. Throughout the duration of the mission, UNPROFOR has maintained a presence in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in order to discharge essential functions of political liaison and public information, along with tasks relevant to monitoring the Prevlaka peninsula, as mandated by resolution 779 (1992), and airfields, as mandated by paragraph 5 of resolution 786 (1992). UNPROFOR's presence in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and the satisfactory level of cooperation with the federal authorities that its office in Belgrade enjoys, have proved to be vital for the effective functioning of all three of the operation's commands. It thus remains necessary to maintain a United Nations peace-keeping presence there, with the same functions as performed hitherto. In this regard, it is important that the federal Government extend to the United Nations force, its personnel, property funds and assets, the necessary privileges and immunities deriving from Article 105 (1) of the Charter, the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, to which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and

Montenegro) is a party and the customary principles and practices applicable to United Nations peace-keeping or similar operations.

83. At this time of severe financial constraints, I am conscious of the high costs of UNPROFOR, which remains the largest peace-keeping operation ever fielded by the Organization and accounts for a substantial portion of its peace-keeping expenditures. I continue to examine ways to reduce costs, specifically in the organization of logistic support to UNPROFOR's Bosnia and Herzegovina Command and in the supply and consumption of food and fuel. Compliance by the Governments of Croatia and of Bosnia and Herzegovina with their obligations to the international community would have a beneficial impact on the Organization's budget.

84. The Governments of Croatia and of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia have expressed the wish that the United Nations forces in their countries should be separate from UNPROFOR. The Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina has also expressed a wish for possible changes in the existing arrangements in that Republic. In order to respond to their wishes, but without compromising the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of an integrated United Nations peace-keeping effort in the theatre, I propose that the present United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) be replaced by three separate but interlinked peace-keeping operations: United Nations Peace Force - One (UNPF-1) in Croatia, United Nations Peace Force - Two (UNPF-2) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and United Nations Peace Force - Three (UNPF-3) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Each of the three operations would be headed by a civilian Chief of Mission at the assistant secretary-general level and would have its own military commander. In view of the interlinked nature of the problems in the area and in order to avoid the expense of duplicating existing structures, overall command and control of the three operations would be exercised by my Special Representative and a Theatre Force Commander commanding the military elements of the Force under his authority. Their theatre headquarters, known as United Nations Peace Forces headquarters (UNPF-HQ), would be in Zagreb and the administrative, logistical and public information responsibilities of the three operations would be coordinated there. UNPF-HQ would also be responsible for liaison with the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), other concerned Governments and NATO.

85. I accordingly recommend that the Security Council approve the following:

(a) The restructuring of UNPROFOR as described in paragraph 84 above;

(b) The negotiation, on the basis of the elements identified in paragraph 72 above, of a new mandate and functions for UNPF-1, which would be significantly smaller than the present UNPROFOR strength in Croatia. This mandate would extend until 30 November 1995 and would come into effect as soon as the Council approves a report from me containing the details of a recommended mandate and of undertakings by the two parties to cooperate in its implementation and confirming the conclusion of a status-of-forces agreement with the Government of Croatia;

(c) The conversion, with immediate effect, of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia into UNPF-2 and UNPF-3

respectively, with the same responsibilities and composition as UNPROFOR has at present in those Republics and with mandates also extending to 30 November 1995;

(d) The appeals proposed in paragraphs 51 and 58 above to the Governments in the area to conclude status-of-forces agreements with the United Nations and to grant it suitable broadcasting facilities;

(e) The transfer to the three United Nations Peace Forces (UNPF-1, UNPF-2 and UNPF-3) of the applicability of all relevant Security Council resolutions and authorities relating to the functioning of UNPROFOR in the territories of the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, respectively.

86. In conclusion, I should like to pay tribute to my Special Representative, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, my Special Envoy, Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg, the Force Commander, General Bernard Janvier, his distinguished predecessor, General Bertrand de Lapresle, and the courageous and dedicated men and women of UNPROFOR for their devoted efforts in the service of the United Nations, and of peace, in the former Yugoslavia.

Annex I

Deployment of Units, military observers and civilian police monitors, as of 20 March 1995

	Units	United Nations military observers	Civilian police	Total
1. Croatia				
(a) Headquarters, Zagreb-Belgrade	297 a/	30	48	
(b) United Nations protected areas and "pink zones"				
(i) Infantry units				
Sector East				
Belgium	769	33	138	
Russian Federation (1)	856			
Subtotal, Sector East	1 625			
Sector West				
Argentina	862	36	111	
Jordan (1)	1 028			
Nepal	898			
Subtotal, Sector West	2 788			
Sector North				
Denmark	953 b/	75	125	
Jordan (2)	1 004			
Ukraine (2)	555			
Poland	1 141			
Subtotal, Sector North	3 653			
Sector South				
Canada (1)	793	82	164	
Czech Republic	957			
Jordan (3)	1 251			
Kenya	974			
Subtotal, Sector South	3 975			
(ii) Support units				
Canadian Support Unit	425			

	Units	United Nations military observers	Civilian police	Total
French Logistics Battalion	843			
Norwegian Movement Control Unit	111			
Netherlands logistics base	148			
Slovak Engineer Battalion	567			
Swedish Headquarters Company	128			
United States field hospital	299			
Finnish HQ Guard	43			
Indonesia Medical Battalion	220			
Subtotal, support units	2 784			
(c) Dubrovnik-Prevlaka		27		
(d) Highway patrols			145	
Total, Croatia	14 825	283	731	15 839
2. Bosnia and Herzegovina				
(a) Bosnia and Herzegovina Command headquarters	155 c/	14	45 d/	
(i) Infantry units				
Sector Sarajevo		102		
HQ Sector Sarajevo	69 e/			
Egypt	418			
France (2)	833			
France (4)	854			
France (5)	882			
Russian Federation (2)	472			
Ukraine (1)	460			
Subtotal, Sector Sarajevo	3 988			
(ii) Support units				
French Headquarters Company	212			
French Medical Detachment	26			
French Air Operations Group (DETAIR)	252			
	490			

		Units	United Nations military observers	Civilian police	Total
	Sector North-east		73		
	HQ Sector North-east	54 e/			
	Denmark	125			
	Sweden	1 030			
	Netherlands	730			
	Jordanian Radar	100			
	Pakistan (1)	1 385			
	Pakistan (2)	1 404			
	Pakistan National Support HQ	194			
	Subtotal, Sector North-east	5 022			
	Sector South-west		87		
	HQ Sector South-west	89 e/			
	United Kingdom (1)	698			
	United Kingdom (2)	543			
	United Kingdom Cavalry Battalion	264			
	Canada (2)	820			
	Malaysia	1 545			
	Spain	1 372			
	Turkey	1 469			
	New Zealand	249			
	Subtotal, Sector South-west	7 049			
	Bihac		29		
	HQ Bihac Area	13 d/			
	Bangladesh	1 238			
		1 251			
(iii)	Support units				
	Belgian Transport Company	100			
	Danish Headquarters Company	155			
	French Engineer	457			
	French Support Unit (DETALAT)	265			
	Netherlands Transport Battalion	328			

	Units	United Nations military observers	Civilian police	Total
Netherlands Support Battalion	424			
Norwegian Helicopter Unit	40			
Norwegian Logistics Battalion	596			
United Kingdom, Combined British Forces	1 650			
Tuzla Airbase	24			
Subtotal, support units	4 039			
Total, Bosnia and Herzegovina	21 994	305	45	22 344
3. Airfield (no-fly zone) monitoring				
(a) Airfields		47		
Total, airfield monitoring		47		47
4. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia				
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Command headquarters	53 a/	24	24	
Infantry units				
Nordic Battalion 1	556 f/			
United States Unit	540			
Total, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	1 096	24	24	1 146
Zagreb waiting deployment		25	3	
Total	37 915	684	803	39 402

(Footnotes on following page)

(Footnotes to table)

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a/ Includes headquarters personnel.

b/ Includes 34 troops from Estonia and 33 troops from Lithuania.

c/ Excludes Bosnia and Herzegovina Command headquarters personnel from all Bosnia and Herzegovina Command national units.

d/ Includes the following UNCIVPOL:

Sarajevo Airport	11
Split Airport	4
Sarajevo Sector headquarters	10
Mostar	4
Gornij Vakuf	2
Gorazde	7
Srebrenica	5
Tuzla	2

e/ Excludes headquarters personnel.

f/ Nordic Battalion 1 (NORDBATT 1)

Danish	44
Finnish	427
Norwegian	46
Swedish	39

Annex II

Casualty list as of 20 March 1995

Military personnel

	Croatia				Bosnia and Herzegovina Command	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Command	Other areas	Total
	Sector East	Sector West	Sector North	Sector South				
Hostile actions								
Fatal	3	3	6	7	35	0	0	54
Total	35	19	43	75	378	0	7	557
Other casualties								
Fatal	2	8	9	5	19	0	9	52
Total	42	41	31	30	148	12	77	381
Traffic casualties								
Fatal	2	2	3	6	26	1	3	47
Total	39	52	48	51	192	6	40	428
Totals								
Fatal	7	13	18	18	80	1	12	149
Total	116	112	122	156	718	18	124	1 366

Annex III

Strength by country

Country	Troops	Military observers	Civilian police
Argentina	862	7	23
Bangladesh	1 242	42	37
Belgium	878	6	0
Brazil	0	34	6
Canada	2 058	15	45
Colombia	0	0	12
Czech Republic	957	32	0
Denmark	1 223	15	45
Egypt	433	22	34
Estonia	34	0	0
Finland	470	12	10
France	4 676	10	41
Ghana	0	32	0
Indonesia	220	25	15
Ireland	0	9	20
Jordan	3 383	48	71
Kenya	874	46	50
Lithuania	33	0	0
Malaysia	1 552	25	25
Nepal	898	5	50
Netherlands	1 676	48	10
New Zealand	254	9	0
Nigeria	0	31	68
Norway	821	42	30
Pakistan	2 993	33	18
Poland	1 141	30	29
Portugal	2	12	41
Russian Federation	1 336	22	33
Senegal	0	0	18

Country	Troops	Military observers	Civilian police
Slovakia	567	0	0
Spain	1 394	19	0
Sweden	1 209	18	35
Switzerland	0	6	6
Tunisia	0	0	12
Turkey	1 478	0	0
Ukraine	1 035	10	19
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	3 273	19	0
United States of America	843	0	0
Venezuela	0	0	0
Total	37 915	684	803


The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
AUSTRIA
ITALY
SLOVENIA
Ljubljana
SAN MARINO
ADRIATIC SEA
وزع قوة الأمم المتحدة للحماية في آذار/مارس ١٩٩٥
1995年3月联保部队的部署
UNPROFOR DEPLOYMENT AS OF MARCH 1995
DEPLOIEMENT DE LA FORPRONU AU MOIS DE MARS 1995
РАЗВЕРТЫВАНИЕ СООНО ПО СОСТОЯНИЮ НА МАРТ 1995
DESPLIEGUE DE LA UNPROFOR EN MARZO DE 1995
0 50 100 150 km
0 50 100 mi
Map No. 3684 Rev. 6 UNITED NATIONS
March 1995

HUNGARY
ROMANIA
FEDERAL REPUBLIC
SERBIA
OF
YUGOSLAVIA
(Serbia and Montenegro)
VOJVODINA
MONTENEGRO
KOSOVO
Beograd
(Belgrade)
Vidin
Sofia
BULGARIA
Skopje
Tirana
ALBANIA
THE FORMER YUGOSLAV
REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA
GREECE
Pecs
SLOVENGBATT
BELBATT
ARGBATT
INDOBATT
USRATT
NORBATT
Danube
Lake Ohrid
Lake Dojran
United Nations Protected Areas
Zones protégées par les Nations Unies
Районы, охраняемые Организацией Объединенных Наций
Zonas Protegidas por las Naciones Unidas
Pink Zones
Monitored No-Fly Zone Airport
UNPROFOR (Croatia)
UNPROFOR (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
UNPROFOR (The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia)

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/222/Corr.1
29 March 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 947 (1994)

Corrigendum

Replace annex I by the attached.

95-09051 (E) 290395 300395

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Infantry units				
Nordic Battalion 1	556 f/			
United States Unit	540			
Total, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	1 096	24	24	1 146
4. Other locations				
(a) Airfield monitors		47		
(b) Belgrade	3 g/			
(c) Dubrovnic/Prevlaka		27		
Total, other locations	3	74		77
5. Zagreb, waiting deployment		25	3	
Grand total	37 915	684	803	39 402

(Footnotes on following page)

(Footnotes to table)

---

a/ Includes headquarters personnel.

b/ Includes 34 troops from Estonia and 33 troops from Lithuania.

c/ Excludes Bosnia and Herzegovina Command headquarters personnel from all Bosnia and Herzegovina Command national units.

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Tuzla	2

e/ Excludes headquarters personnel.

f/ Nordic Battalion 1 (NORDBATT 1)

Danish	44
Finnish	427
Norwegian	46
Swedish	39

g/ Also comprises 6 international and 3 local civilian staff.